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I. INTRODUCTION
With its 1986 decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,1
the United States Supreme Court put its imprimatur on the Title VIP
sexual harassment cause of action that had emerged over the preceding
decade.3 Early commentary on the case tended to emphasize this aspect
of the Court's decision4 or to speculate about Meritor's impact on the
future course of Title VII sexual harassment litigation.5 Getting rela-
tively short shrift in this early commentary, however, was the Court's
command that "agency principles"-the common law of agency-be
consulted to determine an employer's liability for harassment commit-
ted by its employees.' As subsequent observers noted, the Court's re-
course to agency law added considerable confusion to the employer
liability issue.1 This aspect of Meritor, however, has rarely, if ever, been
directly challenged.
After nearly five years of judicial floundering with agency princi-
ples, it seems time for such a challenge. This Article argues that Mer-
itor's command to consult agency law on the employer liability question
1. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Meritor is described infra at subpart II(C).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
3. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-67 (conceding tacitly that Title VII prohibits sexual har-
assment with tangible economic consequences, and holding that it proscribes some harassment
without such consequences-so-called "work environment" harassment-as well).
4. See, e.g., Cooper & Hodgson, Meritor' Supports EEOC View of Sex Harassment, LEGAL
TmEs, July 7, 1986, at 20.
5. See, e.g., Cook, The New Bias Battleground. Sex Harassment, NAT'L L.J., July 7, 1986, at
1.
6. "We ... decline the parties' invitation to issue a definitive rule on employer liability, but
we do agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance
in this area." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
7. E.g., Levy, The Change in Employer Liability for Supervisor Sexual Harassment after
Meritor: Much Ado about Nothing, 42 ARa L. Rlv. 795, 823 (1989) (stating that "Meritor has only
muddied the waters on the employer liability issue"); Note, A View Against Strict Employer Lia-
bility Under Title VII for Sexually Offensive Work Environments Created by Supervisory Per-
sonnel: Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 91 Dicta L. REv. 1157, 1175 (1987) (asserting that Meritor
has left the issue of employer liability for sexual harassment "in a state of turmoil" and "has
produced confusion and inconsistent results"); Comment, Inadequacies in Civil Rights Law: The
Need for Sexual Harassment Legislation, 48 OHmo ST. L.J. 1151, 1151 & n.7 (1987) (finding that in
'the employer liability and other contexts, Meritor "raised as many questions as it answered, and
left the lower courts to wade through a swamp of ambiguities").
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was a bad ruling from almost every conceivable angle. Part II briefly
surveys the evolution of sexual harassment law and the rules courts
have applied to determine employer liability. Part III examines in de-
tail the agency law rationales that allegedly underlie those rules, finding
them individually and collectively defective. This examination also sug-
gests that agency law is not well suited to the task the Court assigned
it. Part IV bolsters this suggestion in two different, though complemen-
tary, ways. First, it argues that the Meritor Court almost certainly was
wrong when it ruled that Title VII requires courts to consult agency law
when determining an employer's sexual harassment liability. Second, it
argues that agency law is useless for resolving the policy questions un-
derlying the debate about the scope of such liability. Although the main
aim of this Article is to attack Meritor's command to employ agency
principles, Part IV contains some tentative recommendations on the
employer liability issue.
II. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR EMPLOYEE SEXUAL HARASSMENT: AN
OVERVIEW
A. Title VII Sexual Harassment Claims
Because Title VII's ban on gender-based discrimination by employ-
ers s was a late addition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,9 little legislative
history exists to assist courts in applying Title VII to sexual harassment
claims.10 Despite Congress's failure to consider the subject, courts began
to recognize sexual harassment claims" during the late 1970s. 12 By the
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2), (d) (1988). For the definition of the term "employer," see
id. § 2000e(b) and infra subpart IV(B)(1).
9. See, e.g., Note, Between the Boss and a Hard Place: A Consideration of Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson and the Law of Sexual Harassment, 67 B.U. L. REv. 445, 449 n.16 (1987)
[hereinafter Note, Between the Boss and a Hard Place]; Note, Employer Liability Under Title
VII for Sexual Harassment after Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1258, 1259
n.9 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Employer Liability] (both describing the history of this provision's
addition to Title VII).
10. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 7, at 1152 (noting that Title VII's legislative history
"shows absolutely no attempt to address the sexual harassment issues that courts and agencies are
currently regulating under the Act"); see also id. at 1164-66.
11. Like most commentary on sexual harassment, this Article addresses only the paradigm
instance of such behavior: sexual harassment visited upon women by their male supervisors or
coemployees. But sexual harassment of men by women occasionally occurs, and it is actionable
under Title VII. See, e.g., 1 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRINATION § 41.63(0 (1991).
In addition, some courts have recognized Title VII claims for homosexually-oriented harassment.
See, e.g., id. § 41.63(g). At least one court has suggested, however, that employees of either gender
who suffer harassment from a bisexual supervisor do not have a sex discrimination claim because
the supervisor's actions would affect male and female employees alike. See Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Finally, some courts have recognized Title VII claims by em-
ployees who were denied an employment opportunity or benefit due to another employee's acqui-
escence in sex-related behavior. See, e.g., 1 A. LARsoN & L. LARSON, supra, § 41.63(i); see also
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early 1980s, courts,13 commentators,'14 and the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) 15 had embraced the now-familiar dis-
tinction between quid pro quo sexual harassment and work
environment sexual harassment.'6
Supervisor conduct that conditions an employee's tangible job sta-
tus or job rewards on her submission to unwelcome sex-related behavior
is quid pro quo sexual harassment. 17 The link between submission and
tangible job consequences may be overt.' But liability for quid pro quo
sexual harassment also exists when employers base employment deci-
sions on an employee's refusal to submit, even though no express quid
pro quo was proffered.' 9 In either case, courts generally agree that the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(g) (1990) [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines].
Employees who have been subjected to sexual harassment also may have various intentional
tort claims against the offending individuals and their employer, and they may even have equal
protection and RICO claims as well. See generally Dworkin, Ginger & Mallor, Theories of Recov-
ery for Sexual Harassment: Going Beyond Title VII, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125 (1988). Finally,
sexual harassment may be actionable under state employment discrimination laws. E.g., B. SCHLEI
& P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIscRmNATIoN LAW 428 (2d ed. 1983). These avenues of recovery
are important because of the relatively limited remedies available to harassment victims under
Title VII. Title VII remedies are primarily equitable in nature and normally do not include com-
pensatory or punitive damages. See, e.g., 1 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra, § 41.66(c). Recently,
however, Congress has attempted to amend Title VII to allow compensatory and punitive damages.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 856, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (proposing to allow punitive as well as compensa-
tory damage awards for employer behavior that is malicious or recklessly or callously indifferent).
12. On the early development of sexual harassment claims under Title VII, see, e.g., At-
tanasio, Equal Justice Under Chaos: The Developing Law of Sexual Harassment, 51 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1, 1-5 (1982); Comment, The Harms of Asking: Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of
Sexual Harassment, 55 U. CHL L. REv. 328, 329-37 (1988).
13. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (recognizing explicitly the dis-
tinction); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901-06, 908-13 (11th Cir. 1982) (considering
each type of claim).
14. See, e.g., Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title
VII, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1449, 1454 (1984) and sources cited therein.
15. See EEOC Guidelines, supra note 11, § 1604.11(a) (recognizing both claims but not using
these terms).
16. For somewhat varying accounts of how these two sexual harassment claims fit within
Title VII's proof rules, see, e.g., Bryan, Sexual Harassment as Unlawful Discrimination Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 14 Loy. LA. L. Rav. 25, 39-47 (1980); Note, supra note
14, at 1454-57; Note, The Aftermath of Meritor: A Search for Standards in the Law of Sexual
Harassment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717, 1721 n.17 (1989).
17. Because supervisors have sufficient delegated power to leverage compliance with their
sexual demands and coworkers do not, only supervisors are capable of quid pro quo harassment.
See Note, Employer Liability, supra note 9, at 1260. The range of sex-related behaviors encom-
passed by quid pro quo sexual harassment is wide. See, e.g., EEOC Guidelines, supra note 11, §
1604.11(a) (announcing that unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other ver-
bal or physical conduct of a sexual nature may constitute quid pro quo sexual harassment).
18. E.g., Henson, 682 F.2d at 900, 911 (employee who alleged that her boss told her that he
would help her attend a police academy if she would have sexual relations with him stated a quid
pro quo claim).
19. See, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599 (7th
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employee must have suffered some tangible job detriment to pursue a
quid pro quo claim. 0
A tangible employment-related detriment, however, is not required
in suits alleging work environment sexual harassment.21 In such cases,
the harassment victim typically is subjected to unwelcome 22 sex-related
behavior"s that has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with her work performance or of creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.24 In the archetypal work environment
case, a woman suffers a barrage of sex-related inquiries, jokes, slurs,
propositions, touchings, and other forms of abuse.25 For such behavior
to violate Title VII, however, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abu-
sive working environment. 6 Both supervisors and fellow employees may
engage in work environment sexual harassment.
B. Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment Prior to Meritor
While they were fashioning the substantive standards for quid pro
quo and work environment sexual harassment, courts also had to con-
sider when employers should be liable for sexual harassment by super-
Cir. 1985), in which the plaintiff was fired for rejecting her supervisor's sexual advances, and the
only utterances even approximating an express quid pro quo were statements by the supervisor
that things would go "easier" with the plaintiff if she would "go out" with him and "get together
with him." Id. at 601-02.
20. E.g., Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989); Highlander
v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793
F.2d 714, 721-22 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Henson, 682 F.2d at 909.
21. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-67 (1986). See also Hall v. Gus Con-
str. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988) (excluding tangible job detriment from a list of ele-
ments required to recover for work environment harassment); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers,
Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1557 (11th Cir. 1987) (same); Henson, 682 F.2d at 902 (obviating the require-
ment that an employee suffering work environment harassment prove that she has suffered a tan-
gible job detriment).
22. Thus, an employee who welcomed, encouraged, or participated in the allegedly harassing
conduct may not bring a work environment claim. See, e.g., Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., Inc., 28 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639, 641 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
23. Actually, the offensive conduct need not be sexual in nature so long as it would not have
occurred unless its victims were of a particular gender. See, e.g., Hall, 842 F.2d at 1013-14 (al-
lowing a cause of action for calling one female employee "Herpes" and urinating into the gas tank
of another's car because each incident, even though not sexual, was attributable to the gender of
the victim).
24. E.g., EEOC Guidelines, supra note 11, § 1604.11(a)(3); see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66
(quoting the Guidelines' formulation with approval); Hall, 842 F.2d at 1013 (quoting Meritor and
the Guidelines).
25. For some fairly representative examples, see, e.g., Katz, 709 F.2d at 254; Bundy v. Jack-
son, 641 F.2d 934, 939-40, 943-46 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For an especially striking example, see Hall, 842
F.2d at 1011-15.
26. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
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visors, employees, and other parties. After some early uncertainty,28
courts settled into a pattern that largely persists to this day. 9 For quid
pro quo harassment by supervisors with authority to make employment
decisions affecting the plaintiff, strict employer liability soon became
the norm.30 But the appropriate liability standard for work environ-
ment harassment by supervisors occasioned some dispute.31 The domi-
nant view was that employers are liable for such harassment only when
they had actual or constructive knowledge of it and failed to take ap-
propriate corrective action.32 The minority view was that supervisory
work environment harassment, like quid pro quo harassment, should
subject employers to strict liability. This dispute, however, did not ex-
27. Because the question has arisen infrequently, this Article does not consider employer
liability for sexual harassment by nonemployees. The EEOC has declared that employers should
be liable for such harassment when they (or their agents or supervisors) knew or should have
known of it and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. EEOC Guidelines,
supra note 11, § 1604.11(e). On this subject, see 1 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 11, §
41.65(d) and cases discussed therein.
28. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977)
(defining the apparent standard as employer's actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment
and its failure to take prompt and appropriate remedial action); Meyers v. ITT Diversified Credit
Corp., 527 F. Supp. 1064, 1069 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (holding that standard is actual or constructive
knowledge of harassment with no attempt to rectify situation and suggesting that no liability exists
when plaintiff failed to avail herself of employer's internal complaint procedures); Ludington v.
Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 480, 483 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (holding that apparent standard
is that employer must have sanctioned acts of its supervisory employees); Heelan v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (D. Colo. 1978) (noting that although plaintiff need not
prove an employer's discriminatory policy or practice, an employer that lacked knowledge of har-
assment is not liable if it had a policy or history of discouraging harassment and plaintiff failed to
present her claim to a publicized grievance board; an employer also is not liable if it was aware of
harassment and rectified it); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975),
vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that harassment must be pursuant to company policy
or plan to be actionable). These cases did not expressly distinguish between quid pro quo and work
environment harassment, and they did not indicate whether the liability standards they an-
nounced were applicable to all forms of harassment.
29. See generally infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (describing employer liability af-
ter Meritor).
30. E.g., Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986) (fail-
ing to discuss Meritor, but decided after it); Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes,
Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 1985); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 n.6 (4th Cir. 1983) (dictum);
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909-10 (11th Cir. 1982); Schroeder v. Schock, 42 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1112, 1113-14 (D. Kan. 1986) (failing to discuss Meritor, but decided after
it); see generally 1 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 11, § 41.65(a), at 8-190 & n.70 (finding that
those circuits which have addressed the issue are unanimous in holding an employer liable for
tangible economic detriment caused by a supervisor who uses authority vested in him to commit
quid pro quo harassment; mainly citing pre-Meritor cases).
31. See, e.g., Note, Employer Liability, supra note 9, at 1262-63; Comment, A Theory of
Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1461, 1471-72 (1986)
(noting and describing the disagreement).
32. E.g., Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 1986); Katz, 709 F.2d at 255;
Henson, 682 F.2d at 905.
33. These cases tended to assert that employers should be strictly liable for all sexual harass-
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tend to work environment harassment by nonsupervisory coemployees.
Employers were liable for this type of harassment only when they had
actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment and failed to take
appropriate corrective action. 4
C. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson
Before 1986, therefore, the only serious issue was the extent of em-
ployer liability for work environment harassment by supervisors. Mer-
itor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson presented the Court with precisely
this question.
In Meritor the plaintiff, Mechelle Vinson, sued her employer, the
Capital City Federal Savings and Loan Association, 5 and her supervi-
sor, Sidney Taylor, for Taylor's alleged sexual harassment. According to
Vinson, Taylor fondled her during working hours, exposed himself to
her, entered the women's restroom while she was there alone, compelled
her to have sexual intercourse with him some forty to fifty times over a
two-year period, and raped her on a few occasions. However, Vinson
never complained about this behavior under Capital's grievance proce-
dure or otherwise, allegedly because she feared Taylor. Both Taylor and
Capital denied Vinson's allegations; Capital also argued that even if
those allegations were true, the harassment did not occur with its
knowledge, consent, or approval. It was undisputed that Vinson had re-
ceived several promotions during her four years of employment.
The district court entered judgment for both defendants, finding
that Vinson had not suffered sexual harassment.36 The court concluded
ment by supervisors. See, e.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 147-51 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd sub
noa. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), discussed infra at notes 39-40 and
accompanying text (holding the employer strictly liable for any form of sexual harassment by su-
pervisors with appropriate authority); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(holding, in a case involving supervisory work environment harassment, that the employer was
liable for harassment by supervisors regardless of whether it knew or should have known of the
harassment); cf. Jeppsen v. Wunnicke, 611 F. Supp. 78, 82-83 (D. Alaska 1985) (obviating the need
for plaintiff to prove an employer's knowledge of the harassment in a claim for work environment
harassment by supervisor). This also was the position taken by the EEOC. EEOC Guidelines,
supra note 11, § 1604.11(c).
34. E.g., Katz, 709 F.2d at 255 (defining liability standard in case involving work environ-
ment harassment by both supervisors and nonsupervisors as employer's actual or constructive
knowledge of environment and its failure to take prompt and adequate remedial action); see also
Note, Employer Liability, supra note 9, at 1262 & n.29; Note, Employment Discrimina-
tion-Defining an Employer's Liability Under Title VII for On-The-Job Sexual Harassment:
Adoption of a Bifurcated Standard, 62 N.C. L. Rav. 795, 806 n.109 (1984). The EEOC's 1980
Guidelines also took this position. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 11, § 1604.11(d). After quoting
this provision, Larson declares: "A similar rule is generally applied by the courts. This is not a
controversial area." 1 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 11, § 41.65(c), at 8-201.
35. Capital City later became the Meritor Savings Bank.
36. Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 40-43 (D.D.C. 1980).
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that her promotions had been obtained on merit alone, that she had not
been required to grant Taylor sexual favors to obtain them, and that
any sexual relations between herself and Taylor were voluntary on her
part.3 7 It also held that Capital could not be liable because it had no
notice of Taylor's alleged actions, and concluded that notice to an alleg-
edly harassing supervisor like Taylor is not notice to his employer.",
Although the district court's findings apparently disposed of any
quid pro quo claim by Vinson, the court did not differentiate between
quid pro quo and work environment harassment in its opinion. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals seized upon this omission in re-
versing the district court, holding that Vinson had stated a claim for
work environment harassment.39 More important for the purposes of
this Article, the D.C. Circuit also held that Capital's failure to receive
notice was irrelevant because Title VII makes employers strictly liable
for discriminatory acts by supervisors.40
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. But
while it essentially agreed with the D.C. Circuit that Vinson had stated
a claim for work environment harassment,41 it differed considerably on
the employer liability question.42 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist "decline[d] . . . to issue a definitive rule on employer liabil-
ity."'43 He asserted, however, that "Congress wanted courts to look to
agency principles for guidance in this area. ' 44 In language strikingly
similar to that used in the EEOC's amicus curiae brief,45 he justified
37. Id. at 42.
38. Id. at 41-42.
39. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 144-46 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The court of appeals overcame
the district court's finding that any sexual relations between Vinson and Taylor were voluntary by
holding that the voluntariness of a victim's submission does not defeat her claim. Id. at 145-46.
40. Id. at 146-52.
41. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-67 (1986). On the voluntariness issue,
the Court said: "[Tihe fact that sex-related conduct was 'voluntary,' in the sense that the com-
plainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit
brought under Title VII. The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual
advances were 'unwelcome.'" Id. at 68.
42. Justice Marshall's concurring opinion basically adopted the D.C. Circuit's rule of strict
liability for supervisory harassment. Id. at 74-77 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall was
joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice Stevens, however, also joined the ma-
jority opinion, mainly "[b]ecause I do not see any inconsistency between the two opinions." Id. at
73 (Stevens, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 72.
44. Id.; see also Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission as Amici Curiae at 22-24, Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-
1979) [hereinafter EEOC Brief]. As Justice Rehnquist noted, the EEOC's position in Meritor was
"in some tension with the EEOC Guidelines, which hold an employer liable for the acts of its
agents without regard to notice." 477 U.S. at 71. On the Guidelines' position, see EEOC Guide-
lines, supra note 11, § 1604.11(c).
45. Here, the Brief stated:
1236 [Vol. 44:1229
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this resort to agency law by invoking Title VII's definition of the term
"employer": 46
While such common-law principles may not be transferable in all their particu-
lars to Title VII, Congress' decision to define "employer" to include any "agent" of
an employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place some limits on
the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsi-
ble. For this reason, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that
employers are always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their
supervisors.4
7
The Court also asserted that the absence of notice to an employer does
not necessarily insulate it from liability, and that employers do not nec-
essarily escape liability merely because they maintained a grievance
procedure that the plaintiff failed to use.48
D. Employer Liability After Meritor
The employer liability picture sketched earlier has changed re-
markably little in the years since Meritor was decided. For example,
courts continue to hold employers strictly liable for quid pro quo sexual
harassment.4 9 And they continue to find employer liability for work en-
vironment harassment by coemployees only when the employer had ac-
tual or constructive knowledge of the harassment and failed to take
appropriate corrective action. 0 Moreover, post-Meritor courts continue
While such common-law principles are not necessarily transferrable in all their particulars to
Title VII, Congress's decision to use the term "agent," rather than such words as
"subordinate" or "supervisory employee," surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the
acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible.
EEOC Brief, supra note 44, at 22.
46. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988) (defining employer to include
agent); infra subpart IV (B)(1).
47. 477 U.S. at 72 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 219-237 (1958)).
48. Id. (conceding that these factors nonetheless are relevant). On the latter point, Justice
Rehnquist noted that Capital's nondiscrimination policy did not specifically address sexual harass-
ment and that its grievance procedure required an employee to complain first to her supervisor, in
this case Taylor. Thus, "[the bank's] contention that [Vinson's] failure should insulate it from
liability might be substantially stronger if its procedures were better calculated to encourage vic-
tims of harassment to come forward." Id. at 73.
49. E.g., Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989); Spencer v.
General Elec. Co., 697 F. Supp. 204, 217 n.14 (E.D. Va. 1988) (dictum), af'd, 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir.
1990); Sowers v. Kemira, 701 F. Supp. 809, 824 (S.D. Ga. 1988); Shrout v. Black Clawson Co., 689
F. Supp. 774, 780-81 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
Some of these cases assert, probably wrongly, that Meritor announced a strict liability rule for
quid pro quo harassment. Before telling courts to look to agency principles, the Meritor Court
discussed the parties' various positions on the employer liability question, among them the
EEOC's view that strict liability is appropriate in quid pro quo cases. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-71.
Despite its general approval of the EEOC's approach, however, the Court did not explicitly en-
dorse this rule. Also, quid pro quo harassment was not at issue by the time the Court decided the
case.
50. See, e.g., Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1990); Baker v.
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to disagree about the appropriate liability standard for work environ-
ment harassment by supervisors. Although occasionally a court will use
strict liability in such cases,5 most courts continue to apply the actual-
or-constructive-knowledge standard.52
Most courts employing this standard consider complaints to mid-
dle- or upper-level management sufficient to give an employer actual
knowledge. 3 Even if an employer lacks actual knowledge, however, per-
vasive harassment usually creates constructive knowledge.5 4 Of course,
employers with actual or constructive knowledge can avoid liability by
promptly taking corrective action55 that is reasonably calculated to pre-
vent further harassment.56 Failure to take such action can doom an em-
ployer to liability.57
Absent her employer's constructive knowledge, a victim who fails
to report harassment to some responsible manager or supervisor will
have difficulty recovering under the actual-or-constructive-knowledge
Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1344 (10th Cir. 1990); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010,
1015-16 (8th Cir. 1988); Kirkland v. Brinias, 741 F. Supp. 692, 694 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); Hunter v.
Countryside Ass'n for the Handicapped, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 1277, 1278-79 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
51. Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 261, 273-74 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (following the
EEOC's Sexual Harassment Guidelines and Justice Marshall's concurrence in Meritor); cf. Volk v.
Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1436 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating flatly that an employer is strictly liable for
sexual harassment by supervisory employees without differentiating between quid pro quo and
work environment harassment; the case apparently involved both forms of harassment).
52. E.g., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 420-21 (7th Cir. 1989); Paroline v. Unisys
Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106 (4th Cir. 1989), aff'd & rev'd in part on different grounds, 900 F.2d 27
(4th Cir. 1990); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989); Ross v.
Twenty-Four Collection, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 1547, 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1988), afl'd, 875 F.2d 873 (11th
Cir. 1989).
53. E.g., Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 478 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that
plaintiff can show actual notice by proving that she complained to higher management; a com-
plaint to her supervisor apparently sufficed here); Hall, 842 F.2d at 1016 (finding complaints to a
foreman sufficient).
54. E.g., EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1516 (9th Cir. 1989); Waltman, 875 F.2d at
478; Silverstein v. Metroplex Communications, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 863, 870 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (finding
harassment not so pervasive as to put employer on constructive notice); 1 A. LARSON & L. LARSON,
supra note 11, § 41.65(a), at 8-195; see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (noting that the trial court had
yet to determine whether Taylor's harassment was so pervasive and continuous that the employer
must have become conscious of it).
55. E.g., Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d at 1515-16; Hunter, 723 F. Supp. at 1279; Silverstein, 678
F. Supp. at 870.
56. Guess, 913 F.2d at 465; Brooms, 881 F.2d at 421. Another possible requirement is that
the remedial action leave the victim no worse off than she would have been had her work life been
free of harassment. Guess, 913 F.2d at 465 (suggesting as examples of remedies that make the
victim "worse off" transfers that reduce her wages, decrease the amenities of her work, or impair
her prospects of promotion).
57. See, e.g., Waltman, 875 F.2d at 478-81; Hall, 842 F.2d at 1016; 1 A. LARSON & L. LARSON,
supra note 11, § 41.65(b), at 8-200 (noting also that a failure to investigate may subject an em-
ployer to liability).
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standard.5" Moreover, although the EEOC's Sexual Harassment Guide-
lines might be interpreted to require employers to adopt an antiharass-
ment policy, 59 the courts apparently have been reluctant to require
them to implement preventive measures.60 Still, the courts generally
seem to have followed Meritor's statement that a victim's failure to use
an existing grievance procedure or antidiscrimination policy does not
necessarily insulate her employer from liability.6 1
III. EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER AGENCY PRINCIPLES
Meritor did little to change the rules for determining employer lia-
bility in sexual harassment cases.62 But it has affected the way courts
approach the question. Although agency law rationales occasionally ap-
peared in pre-Meritor decisions on employer liability, they have become
much more common since the case was decided e.6  This section details
58. E.g., Silverstein, 678 F. Supp. at 870 (holding for the employer in suit for work environ-
ment harassment by a supervisor and coworkers when plaintiff failed to complain despite having
the opportunity to do so, and harassment was not so pervasive as to put the employer on construc-
tive notice).
59. The EEOC Guidelines provide:
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer should take
all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising
the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing em-
ployees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under Title VII, and
developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
EEOC Guidelines, supra note 11, § 1604.11(f). The Guidelines do not state, however, that employ-
ers are liable under Title VII for failing to meet these obligations. On corporate antiharassment
programs, see generally infra subpart IV(C)(2).
60. See 1 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 11, § 41.65(b), at 8-198 (stating that "[u]nder
certain circumstances, an employer's failure to implement preventive measures may contribute to a
finding of liability;" citing and discussing only one case in support of this statement). But see
Paroline, 879 F.2d at 107 (stating that it will impose liability on an employer who anticipated or
reasonably should have anticipated that the plaintiff would suffer sexual harassment, but failed to
take action reasonably calculated to prevent such harassment).
61. See, e.g., Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d at 1516 (holding that plaintiff's failure to use em-
ployer's internal procedures did not bar suit when employers did not specifically ban sexual har-
assment and required an initial report to a supervisor who engaged in or condoned the
harassment); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 635 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that employer's an-
tiharassment policy failed to protect it from liability because it gave responsibility for reporting
and correcting the harassment to supervisors who themselves might harass subordinates, it failed
to work in practice, and it was vague). Properly constructed and implemented antiharassment poli-
cies, however, obviously can improve an employer's legal position in certain circumstances. See,
e.g., 1 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 11, § 41.65(b), at 8-198.
62. For the reasons why Meritor matters nonetheless, see infra subpart IV(B) & Part V.
63. Some post-Meritor decisions considering employer liability, however, contain no discern-
ible discussion of agency law. See Brooms, 881 F.2d 412; Paroline, 879 F.2d 100; Waltman, 875
F.2d 468; Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 697 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd, 894 F.2d 651 (4th
Cir. 1990); Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 261 (N.D. Tex. 1987). As the subsequent
discussion reveals, however, agency rationales have been used to justify the standards applied in
these cases.
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the most important agency-based approaches courts have used to legiti-
mate the employer liability rules they apply. 4 It then examines a set of
agency principles that seem highly relevant to this question, but that
have been ignored by courts, commentators, and the EEOC.
The courts' use of agency law in sexual harassment cases is deeply
flawed in technical legal terms. Each rationale, approach, or set of rules
discussed below forms a distinct basis of liability. Thus, courts should
consider them seriatim. 5 Only occasionally, however, does this occur.66
Instead, courts tend to emphasize particular rationales in particular lia-
bility settings, leading one to suspect that the rationale was chosen to
generate a preordained result. The rationales themselves, moreover, are
often dubious. Some have questionable roots in agency law, some mis-
state or misapply accepted agency rules, and some involve rules whose
relevance to the employer liability issue is questionable.
A. The Henson "Authority" Rationale
Although employer liability for work environment harassment by
supervisors continues to provoke disagreement, an actual-or-construc-
tive-knowledge standard predominates in this area.6 7 Perhaps the most
important argument against this standard is that because Title VII
makes employers strictly liable for discrimination by supervisors, and
because courts impose strict liability when supervisors engage in quid
pro quo harassment, supervisory work environment harassment should
therefore be treated similarly. 8 The actual-or-constructive-knowledge
standard's main justification, on the other hand, employs agency law
concepts. The most influential statement of this justification appears in
the Eleventh Circuit's 1982 decision in Henson v. City of Dundee.6 9
64. For a few others that have not been widely used, see EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual
Harassment, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA), 405:6681, 6698-99 (March 19, 1990) [hereinafter EEOC Pol-
icy Guide].
65. In Meritor Justice Rehnquist cautioned that "such common-law principles may not be
transferable in all their particulars to Title VII." 477 U.S. at 72. But if courts are allowed to pick
and choose among the smorgasbord of agency rationales presented below, the "guidance," id., pre-
sumably provided by agency law is no guidance at all.
66. See Fields v. Horizon House, Inc., No. 86-4343, 1987 U.S. Dist LEXIS 11315 (E.D. Pa.
1987) (conducting such a seriatim review). In addition, a March 19, 1990 EEOC policy guide for its
field office personnel employs what is arguably a seriatim approach while attempting to impose
some order on the confusion generated by Meritor and apparently trying to inch the EEOC toward
tougher employer liability standards. See EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 64, at 6693-99.
67. See supra notes 31-33, 51-52 and accompanying text.
68. E.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 75-77 (Marshall, J., concurring).
69. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). A similar rationale appears in Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-71,
where the Court quoted with apparent approval, but did not expressly adopt, the reasoning con-
tained in the EEOC Brief, supra note 44, at 23-24, which in turn cited Henson. For still other
rationales of this kind, see, e.g., Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th
Cir. 1989); EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 64, at 6694 (using the rationale only to justify strict
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In Henson, which involved both quid pro quo and work environ-
ment harassment by a supervisor, the court justified its bifurcated lia-
bility standard in the following fashion:
The environment in which an employee works can be rendered offensive in an
equal degree by the acts of supervisors,. . . coworkers,. . . or even strangers to the
workplace. The capacity of any person to create a hostile or offensive environment
is not necessarily enhanced or diminished by any degree of authority which the
employer confers upon that individual. When a supervisor gratuitously insults an
employee, he generally does so for his reasons and by his own means. He thus acts
outside the actual or apparent scope of the authority he possesses as a supervisor.
His conduct cannot automatically be imputed to the employer any more so than
can the conduct of an ordinary employee.
The typical case of quid pro quo sexual harassment is fundamentally different.
In such a case, the supervisor relies upon his apparent or actual authority to extort
sexual consideration from an employee. Therein lies the quid pro quo. In that case,
the supervisor uses the means furnished to him by the employer to accomplish the
prohibited purpose. He acts within the scope of his actual or apparent authority to
"hire, fire, discipline or promote." . . . Because the supervisor is acting within at
least the apparent scope of the authority entrusted to him by the employer when
he makes employment decisions, his conduct can fairly be imputed to the source of
his authority.70
Although this statement gives arguments for imposing strict liability in
quid pro quo cases and for treating supervisory work environment har-
assment differently, it does not justify any particular standard in the
latter situation. In a footnote, however, the court concluded that an em-
ployer's liability for work environment harassment by supervisors "is
coextensive with its liability for the acts of an employee," and that
under the EEOC Guidelines this liability is determined under an ac-
tual-or-constructive-knowledge standard.71
Two distinct contentions lie beneath Henson's superficially plausi-
ble argument. Both involve the familiar agency concept of authority. Of
authority's many applications in agency law, probably the most impor-
tant is its use to determine a principal's liability on contracts made by
an agent.72 In such cases, of course, the contract binds the principal if
the agent acted within her actual or apparent authority.7
liability in quid pro quo cases).
Henson has been cited fairly frequently in Eleventh Circuit cases adopting the actual-or-con-
structive-knowledge test for work environment harassment by supervisors. E.g., Steele, 867 F.2d at
1316; Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 904 (11th Cir. 1988); Ross v.
Twenty-Four Collection, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 1547, 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1988), af'd, 875 F.2d 873 (11th
Cir. 1989); Silverstein v. Metroplex Communications, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 863, 870 (S.D. Fla. 1988);
see also Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing Henson).
70. 682 F.2d at 910 (citations and footnotes omitted).
71. Id. at 910 n.20 (quoting EEOC Guidelines, supra note 11, § 1604.11(d)).
72. See generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 140-211 (1958).
73. E.g., id. § 140 (suggesting that a principal's liability to a third person on a transaction
conducted by an agent may be based on, inter alia, the fact that the agent was authorized or was
apparently authorized).
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The Restatement (Second) of Agency generally defines authority
as an agent's ability to affect his principal's legal relations.7 4 Authority
may be express, implied, or apparent. Express authority flows from the
principal's actual words to the agent.75 Implied authority may be in-
ferred from the principal's words and other conduct, from the nature of
the agency business and business customs, and from the circumstances
and relations of the parties.7 '6 Express authority and implied authority
together comprise actual authority.7 7 Apparent authority results from
communications of the principal to third parties that cause those par-
ties to form a reasonable belief that an agent has authority."8
The Henson court mistakenly applied these concepts of authority
when it argued that supervisory quid pro quo harassment should be
treated differently than supervisory work environment harassment. The
latter, the court suggested, is outside a supervisor's actual or apparent
authority and thus cannot be imputed to his employer, while the former
involves a supervisor's actual or apparent authority to hire, fire, and
promote and thus can be imputed to his employer.79 But the point of
the Henson exercise is to determine an employer's liability for sexual
harassment. Although supervisors who commit quid pro quo harass-
ment generally have actual and apparent authority of the kinds just
listed, rarely do they have authority to use these powers to harass sub-
ordinates.80 Employers are extremely unlikely to confer such authority
74. See id. §§ 7-8.
75. "It is possible for a principal to specify minutely what the agent is to do. To the extent
that he does this, the agent may be said to have express authority." Id. § 7 cmt. c; see also id. § 26
(suggesting that authority can be created by principal's written or spoken words to agent, reasona-
bly interpreted).
76. "[Mlost authority is created by implication.. .. These powers are all implied or inferred
from the words used, from customs and from the relations of the parties. They are described as
'implied authority.'" Id. § 7 cmt. c; see also id. § 26, 33-35, 43 (discussing the creation and inter-
pretation of, inter alia, implied authority).
77. E.g., H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, AGENCY AND PARTNE RsH 36 (1979). The Restate-
ment calls actual authority "authority." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1958) and its
comments.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1958) (suggesting that apparent authority is
created as to a third person by words or other conduct of the principal that, reasonably inter-
preted, cause the third person to believe that the principal consents to have an act done on his
behalf by the agent or a person purporting to act as an agent).
79. It should be noted that under the Restatement, at least, employees always are agents.
E.g., id. § 2 ("A servant is an agent."); id. § 25 cmt. a ("[A] servant is an agent of a special kind.");
see also id. § 218 Introductory Note (noting the definition of servants in § 2 based on theory that
they are a particular kind of agent). Thus the employer-employee relationship is a principal-agent
relationship as well.
80. The traditional doctrine of employment at will, which says that employees not hired for a
definite term can be fired at any time for any reason, is of no use to those who would urge the
contrary. First, many states now recognize various exceptions to the doctrine; in some of those
states an employee terminated for refusing to engage in sex-related behavior may have a wrongful
discharge claim. See, e.g., Dworkin, Ginger & Mallor, supra note 11, at 144-46. More important,
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expressly."' Claims that a supervisor had implied or apparent authority
to harass almost certainly will fail if, as is increasingly common today,82
the employer maintains an antidiscrimination or antiharassment
policy.83
Thus, because quid pro quo harassment is so infrequently within a
supervisor's actual or apparent authority, Henson's reasoning actually
suggests that, like employer liability for work environment harassment,
employer liability for quid pro quo harassment should be governed by
the actual-or-constructive-knowledge standard. The Henson court, how-
ever, derived this standard from the EEOC's Sexual Harassment Guide-
lines rather than from agency law.84 But if employer liability depends
wholly on agency law, and if the authority rules just discussed are the
only appropriate agency principles, it seems to follow that employers
should never be liable for sexual harassment.
The Henson court also attempted to distinguish quid pro quo and
work environment harassment by noting that with the former, a super-
visor uses his authority as a lever to extort sexual favors. Although this
distinction has little significance under the law of agency, to the Hen-
son court it creates a second, practical justification for treating supervi-
sory quid pro quo harassment differently than supervisory work
environment harassment. Although in the former case the supervisor
uses his authority to compel submission, in the latter, according to the
court, it does him little good: "The capacity of any person to create a
hostile or offensive environment is not necessarily enhanced or dimin-
ished by any degree of authority which the employer confers upon that
individual." 5 But as even the EEOC's Meritor brief conceded, the Hen-
son court's statement "is contrary both to common sense and to practi-
cal experience."8 The same delegated authority that gives supervisors
the present question is not the employer's inherent power to fire, but the authority it gives its
supervisors.
81. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1417-18 (10th Cir. 1987) (asserting that sexual
harassment is not within job description of any supervisor or worker in any reputable business).
82. For some survey data on the frequency with which employers are adopting antiharass-
ment policies, see infra note 203 and accompanying text.
83. Implied authority cannot be inconsistent with the principal's express statements. E.g., H.
REUSCHLRIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 77, at 42. When an employer has communicated an antidis-
crimination or antiharassment policy, subordinates are unlikely to form a reasonable belief that
their supervisors have authority to harass, thus making apparent authority unlikely. See infra
notes 107-09 and accompanying text. However, implied or apparent authority to harass might be
possible where no relevant policy exists and the employer has allowed supervisors to harass subor-
dinates over a period of time. See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
84. Actually, the court could have justified this standard under the direct liability rules dis-
cussed infra at subpart 11(D).
85. Henson, 682 F.2d at 910; see supra text accompanying note 70.
86. EEOC Brief, supra note 44, at 25 n.15.
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leverage in quid pro quo cases also assists them in committing work
environment harassment. Even though the powers that comprise this
authority-firing, promotion, assignments, job perquisites, and so
on-are not made part of an articulated trade, they still enable supervi-
sors to retaliate against subordinates who resist their behavior.87 Thus,
Henson's second argument for distinguishing supervisory quid pro quo
harassment from supervisory work environment harassment also rests
on specious grounds.
B. Respondeat Superior
The Henson court stated that plaintiffs in quid pro quo and work
environment cases must prove respondeat superior as one element of
the sexual harassment claim.8 Presumably the court meant to say im-
puted or vicarious liability, for the actual doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior did not figure in its opinion. The doctrine delineates some of the
situations in which an employer is liable for the work-related torts of
employees.89 The Restatement (Second) of Agency formulates it as fol-
lows: "A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants com-
mitted while acting in the scope of their employment." 9 Employees or
servants, who always are agents under the Restatement,9' include those
customarily described as "employees," as well as supervisors and high-
level managers.12 Under the Restatement's formulation of the notori-
ously imprecise scope-of-employment test, an employee's conduct is
within the scope of employment only if it is of the kind she is employed
to perform, it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space
87. E.g., Note, Between the Boss and a Hard Place, supra note 9, at 459. On some of the
innumerable ways in which supervisors can make life miserable for subordinates who resist, see
Levy, supra note 7, at 810-13.
88. 682 F.2d at 905, 909. Other courts sometimes do the same. See Guess v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing some examples while criticizing this tendency).
89. See W. SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY 141 (1964).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
91. See supra note 79.
92. The Restatement (Second) of Agency provides:
The word "servant" does not exclusively connote a person rendering manual labor, but one
who performs continuous service for another and who, as to his physical movements, is sub-
ject to the control or to the right to control of the other as to the manner of performing the
service.... Thus, ship captains and managers of great corporations are normally superior
servants, differing only in the dignity and importance of their positions from those working
under them. The rulesfor determining the liability of the employer for the conduct of both
superior servants and the humblest employees are the same; the application differs with the
extent and nature of their duties.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. a (1958); see also id. § 220 (listing the factors con-
sidered when determining whether one is a servant). As the preceding quotation suggests, by far
the most important of these factors is the principal's control over, or right to control, the physical
details of the agent's work.
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limits of the employment, and the employee at least partially intends
the conduct to serve the employer."
Employers should virtually never be liable for sexual harassment if
respondeat superior is the agency principle of choice because such be-
havior is rarely, if ever, within the scope of employment under the Re-
statement's criteria. The most important reason is the last scope-of-
employment requirement: that the employee at least partially intends
the conduct to serve the employer. 4 As Judge Richard Posner once re-
marked: "It would be the rare case where. . . harassment against a co-
worker could be thought by the author of the harassment to help the
employer's business. ''5 Because sexual harassment hardly seems within
the scope of an employee's employment, courts and commentators often
conclude that employer liability cannot be justified under respondeat
superior.6
For this reason, one would think, courts should simply decline to
93. Id. § 228(1). If one employee intentionally uses force against another, the use of that
force only falls within the scope of employment when it was "not unexpectable" to the employer.
Id.
As the text suggests, scope of employment and authority, while related, are distinct concepts
under the Restatement. More precisely, under § 228(1) it appears that some elements of the scope-
of-employment test depend upon an employee's authority, but some do not. This point seems to
have escaped the authors of the EEOC's brief in Meritor, which asserted that: "An agent's actions
are generally viewed as being within the scope of his employment if they represent the exercise of
authority actually vested in him, or of authority which third parties reasonably believe him to
possess by virtue of his principal's conduct... ." EEOC Brief, supra note 44, at 22 (citing §§ 7-8
of the Restatement, which define an agent's actual and apparent authority, not an employee's
scope of employment).
94. The Restatement provides: "An act of a servant is not within the scope of employment if
it is done with no intention to perform it as a part of or incident to a service on account of which
he is employed." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 235 (1958). However, some courts may have
abandoned this test. See, e.g., W. KFTON, D. DOBBS, R. KELTON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 504 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; Levy, supra
note 7, at 800 & n.19.
In any event, there are other reasons why sexual harassment probably is outside the scope of
employment. It is at least questionable whether sexual harassment is conduct of the kind an em-
ployee is employed to perform. E.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1417-18 (10th Cir.
1987) (holding that sexual harassment is not within the job description of any supervisor or worker
in any reputable business). Also, in cases where the harassment involves an intentional application
of force, see supra note 93, it may not always have been "expectable" by the employer. However,
because forbidden acts may fall within the scope of employment under Restatement § 230, an
antidiscrimination or antiharassment policy would not necessarily insulate an employer from re-
spondeat superior liability. Also, criminal or tortious acts may sometimes be within the scope of
employment. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 231 (1958).
95. Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986) (refer-
ring to racial harassment).
96. E.g., Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 1988); Hicks, 833 F.2d at
1406, 1418 (finding that the Restatement's respondeat superior provision gives "scant assistance");
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring); Fields v. Hori-
zon House, No. 86-4343, 1987 U.S. Dist LEXIS 11315 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 1987); Note, Between the
Boss and a Hard Place, supra note 9, at 460.
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use respondeat superior in sexual harassment cases. Not all courts, how-
ever, have acted so sensibly. For example, several have used idiosyn-
cratic formulations of the doctrine to find employers liable for employee
sexual harassment.9 7 On the other hand, a few courts have applied the
doctrine conventionally to deny employer liability." Of course, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's Meritor opinion did caution that agency principles
"may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII."' And
perhaps it could be argued that the disarray just depicted reflects the
courts' sensitivity to the equities of particular cases. But the result is a
standardless discretion that is problematic for interpreting a national
employment discrimination statute for which predictability surely has
some value. Even if such discretion is desirable, it can be accomplished
without resort to agency law.
C. Restatement Section 219(2)(d)
Courts that find respondeat superior inapplicable in sexual harass-
ment cases sometimes turn to Restatement (Second) of Agency Section
219(2),100 which contains certain exceptions to the doctrine. One such
exception, Section 219(2)(d), provides:
A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the
scope of their employment, unless:
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there
was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by
the existence of the agency relation.101
This provision contains two distinct bases of liability, each of which has
been employed by courts in Title VII sexual harassment cases.
97. See Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636 (6th Cir. 1987) (reading the Restatement as
saying that the scope-of-employment determination requires courts to examine factors such as
when the act took place, where it took place, and whether it was foreseeable); Horn v. Duke
Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding supervisor's
acts within scope of employment because due to employer's delegation of power to him, supervisor
and employer "essentially merged" and because risk allocation policies used by modern courts to
justify broad respondeat superior liability also justify limiting the scope-of-employment excep-
tion); Shrout v. Black Clawsen Co., 689 F. Supp. 774, 781 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (finding harassment
within scope of employment when it took place during working hours at the office and was carried
out by someone with the authority to hire, fire, promote, and discipline the plaintiff).
98. See Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 517 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (decid-
ing under a state employment discrimination statute whose interpretation was governed in part by
Title VII cases). Also, the district court opinion, preceding the Eleventh Circuit's reversal in
Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987), found the employer not liable
because the harassment in question was not actuated by some purpose to serve the employer, and
because none of the exceptions to respondeat superior were applicable. See Sparks, 830 F.2d at
1558-59.
99. 477 U.S. at 72.
100. E.g., Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1418.
101. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958).
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1. Apparent Authority
Restatement Section 219(2)(d) imposes liability when an employee
purports to act on behalf of his employer, and another party is injured
while relying on authority apparently residing in the employee. After
citing this portion of Section 219(2)(d), °2 the EEOC recently argued
that employers should be liable for work environment harassment by
supervisors if they fail to maintain an adequate antiharassment policy.
The EEOC concluded that employees could reasonably believe an em-
ployer will ignore or tolerate the harassing supervisor's actions if the
employer does not maintain a widely disseminated and consistently en-
forced policy against sexual harassment. Thus, the EEOC generally will
find liability for work environment sexual harassment by a supervisor
when the employer "did not have a reasonably available avenue by
which victims of sexual harassment could complain to someone with au-
thority to investigate and remedy the problem."'' 3 Evidently, however,
this apparent authority only can arise when no appropriate policy ex-
ists. As the EEOC later asserts, "an employer can divest its supervisors
of this apparent authority by implementing a strong policy against sex-
ual harassment and maintaining an effective complaint procedure.
When employees know that recourse is available, they cannot reasona-
bly believe that a harassing work environment is authorized or con-
doned by the employer."'1 4
Although the EEOC's effort to stimulate the adoption of an-
tiharassment policies is admirable, 05 the present question is whether its
102. This portion of § 219(2)(d), however, probably is not sufficiently broad to support the
reading the EEOC gives it. Significantly, the section only applies to situations in which "the ser-
vant purported to act or speak on behalf of the principal." Those who engage in sexual harassment
normally do not purport to act on their employer's behalf while doing so. Even in quid pro quo
cases, supervisors generally do not assert that the trade they offer is intended to advance their
principal's interests.
Just as important, § 219(2) only lists and incorporates a number of specific exceptions to re-
spondeat superior that are contained elsewhere in the Restatement. The Restatement provisions
to which it refers appear largely to limit § 219(2)(d). As comment e to § 219 declares:
Clause (d) includes primarily situations in which the principal's liability is based upon
conduct which is within the apparent authority of a servant, as where one purports to speak
for his employer in defaming another or interfering with another's business. See §§ 247-49.
Apparent authority may also be the basis of an action of deceit (§§ 257-64), and even physical
harm. See §§ 265-67.
Id. § 219 cmt. e. The cited sections involve situations in which the principal's liability is based on
some statement by his agent. Admittedly, however, comment e also cautions that "[t]he enumera-
tion of such situations is not exhaustive." Id.
103. EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 64, at 405:6697; see also Levy, supra note 7, at 802-03.
104. EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 64, at 405:6697.
105. See infra note 208 and accompanying text (urging a different means for accomplishing
essentially the same goal).
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suggested rule'0 6 finds support in agency law. For apparent authority to
exist, a principal must have done something to give third parties a rea-
sonable belief that his agent has authority. 10 7 In the sexual harassment
context, the principal's actions must have given the victim a reasonable
belief that the perpetrator of the harassment had authority to harass.
For this reason, apparent authority seems an unlikely basis for em-
ployer sexual harassment liability. 08 Apparent authority is an equally
unlikely basis for liability in the situation hypothesized by the EEOC,
in which the employer has communicated nothing about harassment to
its employees. At first blush, therefore, there appears to be little basis
in agency law for the EEOC's suggested rule. 09
However, a principal's acquiescence in an agent's course of conduct
can create apparent authority." 0 Thus, an employer who lacks an an-
tiharassment policy and who acquiesces in its supervisors' work envi-
ronment harassment might be liable on this basis.," But it is likely that
such apparent authority exists only when the employer has knowledge
or reason to know of its supervisory agent's conduct."12 Employers,
106. That rule seems to hold only for work environment harassment by supervisors. But
much of what is said infra probably applies both to quid pro quo harassment and to work environ-
ment harassment by coemployees.
107. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
108. This is suggested by Fields v. Horizon House, Inc., No. 86-4343, 1987 U.S. Dist LEXIS
11315 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 1987), a supervisory hostile environment case in which it appeared that the
employer had no antiharassment or antidiscrimination policy. Rejecting employer liability under
§ 219(2)(d), the court first suggested that apparent authority is unlikely when the agent's conduct
is extraordinary or unusual. "Thus," it continued, "it would surely be rare under traditional agency
principles where in non-quid pro quo sexual harassment cases an employer could be found to have
communicated to his employee that the employee's supervisor had the authority to sexually harass
the employee by creating an [sic] hostile working environment." Id. at *14. Applying these general-
izations to the case before it, the court concluded that the conduct of the supervisor was clearly
"for his own gratification." Id. at *12. See also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(MacKinnon, J., concurring) (rejecting § 219(2)(d)'s application because employee could not have
reasonably believed that supervisor's demands derived from employer).
109. At one point, the EEOC argues that in this context apparent authority results merely
from an employer's grant of authority to a supervisor: "This apparent authority of supervisors
arises from their power over their employees, including the power to make or substantially influ-
ence hiring, firing, promotion, and compensation decisions." EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 64, at
405:6697. But no reasonable employee would conclude merely from such a grant of authority that a
supervisor also had authority to harass.
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 43(2) (1958) (suggesting that principal's acqui-
escence in a series of acts by his agent indicates actual authority to perform similar acts in future);
id. § 49 (asserting that rules applicable to interpretation of actual authority generally apply to the
interpretation of apparent authority).
111. One also could speculate about how agency principles would handle employers who pro-
mulgate an appropriate policy but then acquiesce in supervisory harassment. Such unanswered
questions, however, are among the reasons that courts should reject agency law when determining
employer liability.
112. "If such conduct of the agent is known to a third person, as the principal has reason to
know, and the principal makes no manifestation of his objection thereto, although he could easily
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then, should escape liability unless the supervisor's harassment is either
known to middle- or upper-level managers, or is so repeated and fla-
grant as to create constructive knowledge on their part.113 Thus, em-
ployers who fail to adopt an antiharassment policy are not invariably
liable on the basis of apparent authority. Once more, therefore, agency
law seems not to support the EEOC's rule.
2. Employee Aided in Accomplishing the Harassment by the
Existence of the Employment
Section 219(2)(d) also states that employers are liable for employee
torts committed outside the scope of employment when the employee
"was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency re-
lation." 1 4 Read literally, this Section would support strict liability for
all forms of sexual harassment. Every harassing employee derives some
assistance from his employment in accomplishing the harassment.11 5
In apparent recognition of this problem, courts using this portion
of Section 219(2)(d) to find employers liable have done so only in quid
pro quo cases.1 In these cases, the causal link between the agency rela-
tion and the accomplishment of the harassment seems strongest be-
cause the supervisor overtly relies on the authority he obtains through
the agency relation.
However, because Section 219(2) is intended to incorporate a num-
ber of exceptions to respondeat superior that are scattered throughout
the Restatement, the second portion of Section 219(2)(d) probably is
do so, apparent authority is thereby created." RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 43 cmt. c
(1958).
113. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text and infra note 125 and accompanying
text. Also, the offending supervisor's knowledge of his own harassment might be imputed to his
employer. On this possibility, see supra note 38 and accompanying text and infra notes 126-27 and
accompanying text.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958).
115. As one judge pointed out:
Concerning the second part of the [§ 219(2)(d)] exception, at first reading it seems to argue
too much. In every case where vicarious liability is at issue, the agent will have been aided in
some way in committing the tort by the position that he holds. In this case, the male supervi-
sor would not have been in a position to ask petitioner for an "after-hours affair" were it not
for his position as her immediate "boss."
Barnes, 561 F.2d at 996 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
116. See Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1559-60 & nn.8-9 (11th Cir.
1987) (using rule derived from this portion of § 219(2)(d) to establish genuine issue of material fact
as to employer's liability in case in which evidence suggested that supervisor was engaged in quid
pro quo harassment, and claim based exclusively on work environment harassment was not at
issue); Sowers v. Kemira, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 809, 824 (S.D. Ga. 1988) (using § 219(2)(d) and Sparks
to make employer liable for quid pro quo harassment); Schroeder v. Schock, 42 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1112, 1114 (D. Kan. 1986) (basing rule of strict employer liability for quid pro quo
harassment on, inter alia, § 219(2)(d)).
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limited by these specific exceptions.117 In this instance, the limitation
seems severe. Section 219, comment e suggests that the aided-in-accom-
plishing-the-tort exception applies when the employee causes harm be-
cause of his position as agent. For example, a telegraph operator may
create liability for his employer by sending false messages purporting to
come from third persons. Likewise, the manager of a store may create
liability for the owner by using her position to cheat the customers.1 '
Both examples mentioned in Restatement comment e are not analogous
to any form of sexual harassment. Thus, the courts' use of this portion
of Section 219(2)(d) in quid pro quo cases is questionable."19
D. Direct Liability
Restatement Section 219(2) states various other exceptions to the
doctrine of respondeat superior. For the purposes of this analysis, the
most important exception is contained in Section 219(2)(b), which
states that an employer who is negligent or reckless may be liable for
the torts of an employee acting outside the scope of employment. 20
This direct liability stems from the principal's own fault.'21 Such liabil-
ity can be based on, among other things, a principal's negligent or reck-
less orders to or regulations of his agents, employment of improper
persons, supervision of his agents, or failure to prevent negligent or
other tortious conduct by his agents. 22
A negligence-based version of this direct liability rule readily sup-
ports the actual-or-constructive-knowledge test that now prevails in
117. See supra note 102.
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. e (1958). Section 261, the "telegraph oper-
ator" provision, makes the principal liable for fraud committed by a servant or other agent while
apparently acting within his authority, if the principal tlas put him in a position to commit the
fraud. Section 222, the "store manager" provision, only covers undisclosed principals-principals
of whose existence the third party lacks notice. See id. § 222; id. § 4 (defining undisclosed princi-
pals). Victims of harassment plainly do not lack notice of their employer's existence. However,
comment e to § 219 also says that its enumeration of situations is not exhaustive. See supra note
102.
119. See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 996 (MacKinnon, J., concurring) (interpreting this portion of
§ 219(2)(d) to implicate only torts accomplished by an instrumentality, or through conduct, associ-
ated with the agency status, and apparently regarding almost all forms of sexual harassment as
outside its scope).
120. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b) (1958).
121. E.g., Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting Hunter v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417, 1421-22 (7th Cir. 1986)); EEOC Policy Guide,
supra note 64, at 405:6695-96.
122. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) oF AGENCY § 213 (1958). Comment b makes this rule applicable
to situations in which an employee sues her employer for harm arising from the acts of a coem-
ployee. Id. at cmt. b. The rules that specifically deal with such suits, however, are discussed infra
at subpart I1(E).
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work environment sexual harassment cases.123 A negligence-based rule
would hold employers who know or have reason to know that their su-
pervisors or employees are harassing other employees yet fail to take
appropriate corrective action liable for negligent supervision or, in some
cases, failure to prevent tortious conduct. 124 The Restatement's rules
for imputing knowledge from agent to principal probably embody the
accepted standards for determining whether an employer has actual or
constructive knowledge of the harassment.1 5 Those rules, however, also
seem to provide a negative answer to a question addressed by the dis-
trict court in Vinson v. Taylor, the predecessor to Meritor:126 whether a
harassing supervisor's knowledge of his own actions can be imputed to
his employer.1 27
As the preceding discussion suggests, courts have used direct liabil-
ity to justify adopting an actual-or-constructive-knowledge test in work
environment cases. 128 Although apparently no court has ruled on the
issue, 29 direct liability probably would justify the same test in quid pro
quo cases. Because the various liability rules should be considered seria-
123. On the prevalence of this rule, see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Davis v. Utah Power & Light Co., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1331, 1334-
35 (D. Utah 1990) (holding that in sexual harassment case, plaintiff's claim that employer failed to
train and instruct supervisors in certain policies and procedures was sufficient to satisfy Restate-
ment § 219(2)(b) and to defeat employer's motion for summary judgment). On sexual harassment
as a source of intentional tort liability, see generally Dworkin, Ginger & Malior, supra note 11. In
some cases, moreover, an employer might be liable for negligently hiring the harasser.
125. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. Courts usually regard complaints to mid-
dle- or upper-level management as sufficient for actual knowledge. See supra note 53 and accom-
panying text. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 272 (1958) states that "the liability of a
principal is affected by the knowledge of an agent concerning a matter ... upon which it is his
duty to give the principal information." Presumably managers of the kind just described have such
duties. See id. § 381 (describing an agent's duty to give information to his principal).
Pervasive harassment usually gives rise to constructive knowledge on the employer's part. See
supra note 54 and accompanying text. When the harassment is pervasive, at least some middle- or
upper-level managers probably either were aware or should have been aware of it. If there was
actual awareness, knowledge can be imputed to the employer under the rule stated in § 272 of the
Restatement. Comment b of § 272, however, also imputes a supervisor's constructive awareness to
the employer.
126. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (stating the answer of the district court).
127. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 280 (1958) states: "If an agent has done an unau-
thorized act or intends to do one, the principal is not affected by the agent's knowledge that he has
done or intends to do the act." But see infra note 137 (stating a different rule under a different set
of agency principles).
128. See Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1990) (addressing su-
pervisory harassment); Hall, 842 F.2d at 1015-16 (addressing harassment by coworkers); Hunter,
797 F.2d at 1421-22 (addressing racial harassment by coworkers); EEOC Policy Guide, supra note
64, at 405:6695-96.
129. Commentators, however, occasionally urge that strict liability not obtain in quid pro
quo cases. E.g., Conte & Gregory, Sexual Harassment in Employment: Some Proposals Toward
More Realistic Standards of Liability, 32 DRAKE L. REv. 407, 413 (1982-83) (proposing a uniform
across-the-board negligence standard).
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tim, however, an actual-or-constructive-knowledge test could be
avoided if there is a convincing agency law rationale for adopting the
strict liability that now prevails in quid pro quo cases.130 The agency
theories that courts and commentators most frequently use have failed
to provide such a rationale.
E. The Agency Principles No One Uses
To readers who have some familiarity with agency law, the rules
discussed thus far share a troublesome feature: they mainly are used to
determine a principal's liability to third parties, not to his own agents
or employees. 3 1 Restatement Section 473, however, indicates that the
status of the injured party as an employee rather than a third party
does not diminish the employer's liability for his other employees' acts,
"except that he has non-delegable duties of care to servants acting in
the scope of employment. ' 13 2 Thus, it appears that most of the rules
130. On the prevalence of strict liability in quid pro quo cases, see supra notes 30, 49 and
accompanying text.
131. Except for authority, all the agency principles discussed above fit within Chapter 7 of
the Restatement, which is entitled "Liability of Principal to Third Person; Torts." And authority's
main application is in determining a principal's contract liability to third parties. See supra notes
72-73 and accompanying text.
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 473 (1958); see also id. § 472 (subjecting principal
to same liability to a nonservant agent for servants' or other agents' torts, as he is to third
persons).
A portion of § 473 omitted in the text reads: "except where he is not liable for the conduct of
fellow servants, in accordance with the fellow servant rule." Id. § 473. Thus, the rules delineating
an employer's tort liability to third parties do not govern its liability to its employees in cases in
which the fellow servant rule blocks liability. The fellow servant rule says that employers are not
liable for injuries caused solely by the negligence of a coemployee or fellow servant. E.g., PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 94, at 571. The rule, of course, is one of the "unholy trinity" of nineteenth-
century common-law defenses-the others being contributory negligence and assumption of
risk-that often allowed employers to escape liability to injured employees. Id. at 569. By now the
rule has largely been extinguished by statutory regulation of the employment relation (especially
by workers' compensation), and is looked upon with disfavor by courts even when it still might
apply. E.g., id. at 573, 575-76. In light of this history, it seems strange-some readers might say
insane-to read Title VH as forcing the fellow servant rule's consideration in sexual harassment
cases. But § 473 plainly makes the rule relevant for determining an employer's liability under
agency principles. In fact, the fellow servant rule occupies some 18 sections in the second Restate-
ment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 474-491 (1958).
In any event, the fellow servant rule probably does not block employer liability for sexual
harassment even if Title VII somehow makes it relevant. First, the rule seemingly applies only to
coemployee negligence, e.g., id. § 474; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 94, at 571, and sexual har-
assment is more akin to an intentional tort. Second, the fellow servant rule eventually became
inapplicable to the negligence of "vice-principals," who are supervisory employees charged by the
master with performing his nondelegable common-law duties to employees. PROSSER & KEErON,
supra note 94, at 572. Thus, the fellow servant rule most likely would not cover sexual harassment
by supervisors even if the rule covers other culpable behavior besides negligence. Finally, the fel-
low servant rule applies only when the injury was caused solely by the negligence of a coemployee.
E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 474 (1958); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 94, at 571.
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considered earlier also govern an employer's liability to its own
employees.' s3
This Section of the Restatement, however, introduces another set
of agency principles: an employer's nondelegable duties of care toward
employees who act within the scope of their employment. The words
"except that" in Section 473 seem to indicate that these duties supple-
ment the bases of liability discussed earlier. However, various state and
federal laws regulating the workplace, especially workers' compensation
laws, largely have displaced the duties in question.13 4 Given this history,
readers may wonder how Title VII could possibly be construed as coun-
seling recourse to such a body of common-law rules. But if the Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency constitutes a font of agency principles, these
rules clearly qualify for consideration under Meritor. s5 Indeed, they
comprise some twenty-nine sections and fifty-three pages within the
Restatement.' More important, these duties originally were formu-
lated to govern the employer-employee relationship rather than the
principal's relations with third parties. Of the various agency principles
that might be brought to bear in sexual harassment cases, therefore, the
employer's common-law nondelegable duties arguably are the most
relevant.137
Thus, it does not block employer liability when the employer itself was at fault. E.g., RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 213 cmt. b (1958); id. § 470 cmt. d. In particular, the rule does not prevent
employers from being liable for breach of the nondelegable duties discussed below. See id. § 474
cmts. b-c. Thus, even if the fellow servant rule somehow prevents employers from being liable to
their employees under the rules governing their liability to third parties, employers still might be
liable for breach of a nondelegable duty.
133. Because it may not be a tort rule, Henson's "authority" rationale conceivably is an
exception.
134. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 94, at 572-80; H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY,
supra note 77, at 223-34.
135. To this, quibblers might object that Meritor only referenced §§ 219-237 of the second
Restatement. 477 U.S. at 72. But these sections sit within a chapter entitled "Liability of Principal
to Third Person; Torts." Section 473 addresses whether these sections govern an employer's liabil-
ity to its employees, see supra text accompanying note 132. And while § 473 may not compel
consideration of the master's nondelegable duties, it makes them difficult to ignore. Also, a com-
ment to Restatement § 219 cross-references these duties. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 219
cmt. b. (1958) (referring to §§ 473-528).
136. See RESTATEMNT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 492-520 (1958). This does not include the
defenses to suits based on these duties, which total another eight sections. See id. §§ 521-528.
These duties also are discussed in at least one agency treatise. See H. REuscHLEIN & W. GREGORY,
supra note 77, at 207-34.
137. In addition to the matters discussed below, the Restatement's nondelegable duty rules
provide a rationale for imputing a supervisor's knowledge of his own harassment to his employer
and for obligating employers to take suitable corrective action on this basis alone. The Restate-
ment charges an employer with notice of facts affecting the safety of employees if such notice
comes to "a servant or other person whose duty it is to act upon them in the performance of the
master's duty to protect his servants." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 496 (1958).
Knowledge of dangerous workplace conditions obligates the employer to take action. E.g., id.
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An employer's nondelegable duties to its employees resemble those
imposed under the aegis of direct liability, but they also have a few
twists of their own. Because of these twists and the confusion they cre-
ate, it is unlikely that the nondelegable duties would expose employers
to significant liability in sexual harassment cases.
The Restatement articulates the general duty rule in Section 492.
Under that Section, an employer must provide working conditions that
are reasonably safe for its employees. Alternatively, the employer may
warn employees of risks of unsafe conditions that they might not dis-
cover by exercising due care. 138 To elaborate on this bifurcated general
duty standard, the Restatement then delineates many specific duties
including the duty to provide a sufficient number of competent fellow
servants, the duty to supply competent supervisors, and the duty to
promulgate and enforce suitable employment rules.13 9 Each of these du-
ties seems extensible to the sexual harassment context, and each could
lead to employer liability if applied in that context. The Restatement,
however, states the general duty rule in the alternative, with the master
retaining an option to warn his workers of dangerous conditions rather
than correcting those conditions. Evidently the rule means what it says,
for an employer generally "has no duty to use care to make conditions
safe if he gives warning of the risks to the servants.' 40 In the sexual
harassment context this rule suggests that employers could insulate
themselves from liability by warning employees about actual or poten-
tial harassers. To reinforce the point, the Restatement also affords em-
ployers an assumption of risk defense that applies when an employee
continues in the employment with knowledge of the risk.1 4 1
cmt. a. The knowledge imputed to the employer under this rule almost certainly includes knowl-
edge possessed by supervisors, because they presumably have a duty to protect their subordinates.
Cf. id. cmt. a, illus. 1-2. Thus, even the employer who lacks actual knowledge of relevant facts faces
a duty to act once a supervisor acquires knowledge that would trigger the duty. Under this rule,
therefore, a supervisor's knowledge of his own harassment would obligate his employer to take
suitable corrective action-even if the harassment was unknown to everyone except the perpetra-
tor and the victim.
The rule, however, clearly does not extend to notice by coemployees. "A master is not liable to
a servant merely because a fellow servant whose duties do not include the performance of a non-
delegable duty of the master discovers facts which, if known to the master, would subject him to a
duty to take action." Id. cmt. b.
138. Id. § 492.
139. Id. §§ 505, 507-508; see also PROSSER & KaTON, supra note 94, at 569 (mentioning the
first and third of these duties, among others).
140. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 492 cmt. f (1958). This rule does not apply, how-
ever, when a statute provides otherwise, the servant is not free to choose, or it is understood that
the master is to assume the risk. Moreover, other authorities present no counterpart to this rule.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 94, at 568-83 and H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 77, at
207-23.
141. The Restatement asserts:
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To further confuse the picture, finally, the Restatement fails to in-
dicate whether an employer should be liable for the intentionally harm-
ful acts of employees to whom the employer has "entrusted the duty of
making working conditions safe. '142 Sexual harassment generally is in-
tentional behavior, and supervisors presumably are people to whom em-
ployers entrust the duty of making working conditions safe. Thus, the
Restatement's nondelegable duty rules may not speak to supervisory
harassment at all.
IV. THE IRRELEVANCE OF AGENCY LAW IN DETERMINING EMPLOYER
LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. An Introductory Review
The wearying path trod by the preceding section creates major res-
ervations about using agency law to determine employer liability for
sexual harassment. Of course, some of the problems just described are
attributable to certain courts' weak grasp of agency law. But the diffi-
culties run deeper than this. Several sets of agency rules might conceiv-
ably govern the employer liability determination. But some of these
principles-respondeat superior and authority in particular-can have
absurd consequences if applied as they usually are applied in the
agency context. Perhaps those rules' poor fit with sexual harassment
law occurs because they normally are used to determine a principal's
liability to third parties, not an employer's liability to its employees.
But the agency principles that speak directly to the latter situation, the
employer's common-law nondelegable duties, produce confusing results
when applied to sexual harassment. And interpreting Title VII to com-
pel recourse to these nineteenth-century rules seems ridiculous in any
event.
In addition, none of the agency rules examined in the previous sec-
tion produces completely satisfactory results. 43 Perhaps for this reason,
courts tend to apply different rules in different settings, often in an
In the absence of a statute or an agreement to the contrary, a master is not liable to a servant
for harm caused by the unsafe state of the premises or other conditions of the employment, if
the servant, with knowledge of the facts and understanding of the risks, voluntarily enters or
continues in the employment.
RzSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 521 (1958) (emphasis added). Also, even when the employer
neglectfully or intentionally fails to perform his duty, an employee who "becomes aware of a dan-
gerous condition of employment ordinarily has no cause of action for harm thereby suffered." Id. §
492 cmt. f (citing § 521).
142. Id. § 492 caveat.
143. The one possible exception is direct liability, which should produce an across-the-board
actual-or-constructive-knowledge test. But this would involve jettisoning a rule on which almost all
observers agree: strict liability for quid pro quo harassment. In addition, such a test seems vulnera-
ble on policy grounds. See generally infra subpart IV(C).
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apparently manipulative, result-oriented fashion. This is most evident
when courts resort to direct liability, the set of agency principles whose
application to sexual harassment produces fairly coherent results."4
Some courts have used this agency rationale to justify imposing an ac-
tual-or-constructive-knowledge standard in cases involving work envi-
ronment harassment by both supervisors and coemployees. But
apparently no court has employed similar reasoning when considering
quid pro quo harassment, where strict liability routinely is applied.145
This omission would not matter if courts applied the various agency law
rationales seriatim and if one of those rationales supported strict liabil-
ity in quid pro quo cases. However, there is no convincing agency law
rationale for such strict liability.146
B. Vicarious Liability Under Title VII
Because, despite Meritor, the actual standards for determining em-
ployer liability have undergone little or no change over the past several
years,147 the problems just described, while perhaps aesthetically troub-
ling, arguably have little practical consequence. 14  According to this
144. The same is true of the portion of Restatement § 219(2)(d) that makes a principal liable
when the agency relation assisted the agent in committing the tort. This provision has been used
to justify strict liability in quid pro quo cases. But while the provision conceivably could have the
same effect in work environment cases, apparently no court has applied it there. See supra notes
114-16 and accompanying text.
145. See supra subpart I(D).
146. The two most common bases for strict liability in quid pro quo cases are the Henson
rationale and the portion of Restatement § 219(2)(d) making a principal liable where the agency
relation assisted the agent in committing the tort. On the problems with each, see supra subparts
1I1(A) & llI(C)(2).
147. See supra notes 28-34, 49-52, 62 and accompanying text.
148. Another version of the none-of-this-really-matters argument asserts that courts actually
apply some kind of de facto strict liability in all three employer liability contexts. For example,
one observer contends that "courts presently apply strict liability for both claims of sexual harass-
ment [quid pro quo and work environment] when plaintiffs establish the other four elements of the
respective prima facie cases." Note, supra note 16, at 1730. But this statement means little more
than that employers routinely are found liable when the other four elements are present. E.g., id.
at 1730-31 nn.91-92. In most such cases, plainly, courts do not apply strict liability; rather, they
find the defendant liable under various rationales.
When holding in an employer's favor, moreover, many courts explicitly rely on the standard
actual-or-constructive-knowledge test. See, e.g., Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465
(7th Cir. 1990) (work environment harassment by a foreman who apparently was regarded as a
coworker; the employer took prompt and effective remedial action); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuild-
ing, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989) (work environment harassment by a supervisor; the
employer knew of the harassment and took prompt remedial action); Kirkland v. Brinias, 741 F.
Supp. 692, 693-94, 698 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (work environment harassment by a coworker; evidence
that the employer recognized or should have recognized harassment "did not preponderate in favor
of the plaintiffs"); Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 596, 618-21 (W.D. Tex.
1988) (work environment harassment by an assistant manager; no liability because the balance of
credible evidence indicated that plaintiff did not complain and the harassment was not pervasive);
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view, the courts have fashioned sensible consensus standards on the
employer liability question, and the means they use to reach those stan-
dards are irrelevant. But the obvious flaw in this argument is its as-
sumption that the employer liability rules the courts now follow are the
ones they should follow. Surely those rules remain controversial."4 9
Commentators still urge that strict liability should apply when supervi--
sors engage in work environment harassment.1 5 0 At least one observer
argues for extending strict liability to work environment harassment by
coworkers. 15' Commentators at the other end of the spectrum have pro-
pounded an across-the-board negligence standard."5 2
The proper tests for determining an employer's sexual harassment
liability, then, remain a live issue. Unfortunately, Meritor's command
to consult agency principles does little to promote a rational evaluation
of the competing alternatives. Although agency law might be used to
justify any number of approaches to the employer liability question, it
does little to demonstrate the superiority of one approach over another.
Instead, it merely gives courts a smorgasbord of rationales for achieving
predetermined results without having to defend those results on their
merits.
Defenders of Meritor, however, can argue that the blame for this
situation, if any, lies with Congress rather than with the Court. Agency
law, they would maintain, is relevant to the employer liability question
simply because Title VII makes it relevant. As the Court stated in Mer-
itor: "Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include any 'agent' of
an employer . . . surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the
acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held
responsible.' 5 For better or worse, therefore, it seems that agency law
controls, and that the courts' task is to make the best selections from
the array of available agency rationales. This dilemma, however, is a
false one, for Section 701(b) of Title VII almost certainly does not com-
pel recourse to the common law of agency.
Silverstein v. Metroplex Communications, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 863, 870 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (work envi-
ronment harassment by supervisor and coworkers; plaintiff failed to complain and harassment not
so pervasive as to put employer on constructive notice).
149. As one observer noted in 1989, the employer liability question "continues to spawn aca-
demic debate." Note, supra note 16, at 1730.
150. E.g., Levy, supra note 7, at 797.
151. E.g., Note, Between the Boss and a Hard Place, supra note 9, at 467.
152. Conte & Gregory, supra note 129, at 413.
153. 477 U.S. at 72 (some punctuation omitted).
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1. Title VII and Agency Principles
Title VII's Section 703(a) states that "[i]t shall be an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer" to engage in employment discrimi-
nation on the bases of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. '15
In relevant part, Section 701(b) defines an employer as "a person en-
gaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more em-
ployees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a per-
son.' 1 55 Persons, in turn, include individuals, various state and local
governmental bodies, labor unions, partnerships, corporations, and cer-
tain other business entities.158 According to Title VII's plain language,
therefore, agents of these persons are employers if the person in ques-
tion has fifteen or more employees for the statutorily prescribed pe-
riod.157 For this reason, sex discrimination by such agents is an unlawful
employment practice.
Therefore, Section 701(b) employs the term "agent" to identify a
class of persons or entities who qualify as Title VII employers and who
consequently can be liable for the employment discrimination it pros-
cribes. It does not state whether or when employers are liable for dis-
crimination by their employees, nor does it claim that agency law
should determine such questions. In other words, Section 701(b) is an
individual liability provision,' not a vicarious liability provision under
which agents' discriminatory actions are imputed to their employers.
Despite some confused opinions treating Section 701(b) in the lat-
ter fashion, 59 innumerable courts have used the Section to hold agents
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). For some other relevant provisions pertaining to employ-
ers, see id. § 2000e-2(d) to (j).
155. Id. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added).
156. Id. § 2000e(a).
157. B. ScHLEi & P. GROSSMA, supra note 11, at 1002-03 (arguing that an agent is an em-
ployer by virtue of its agency relationship with another employer who meets the number-of-em-
ployees requirement, and need not itself meet that requirement).
158. "Title VII provides that an employer's agent can be individually liable for his discrimi-
natory acts by specifically including agents in the definition of employer." 1 A. LARSON & L. LAR-
SON, supra note 11, § 5.34, at 2-62. Of course, the term "agent" includes other entities besides
natural persons. See, e.g., B. ScmHm & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 11, at 1002 & n.128.
159. See, e.g., Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987)
(holding that under § 701(b), if a supervisor was acting as an agent of the employer when he
sexually harassed a subordinate, the employer is directly liable to the subordinate for his conduct);
Scott v. City of Topeka Police & Fire Civil Serv. Comn'n, 739 F. Supp. 1434, 1438 (D. Kan. 1990)
(holding that the city's delegation of power to hire applicants to a commission made that commis-
sion the city's agent and thus an employer; therefore, the city was liable for employment discrimi-
nation by the commission); Zentiska v. Pooler Motel Ltd., 708 F. Supp. 1321, 1325-26 (S.D. Ga.
1988) (holding the defendant employer "directly liable" for sex discrimination by an agent because
Title VII's definition of employer extends to agents of covered employers); Hallquist v. Max Fish
Plumbing & Heating Co., 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1855, 1859-60 (D. Mass. 1987), aff'd, 843
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individually liable.160 Presumably, agency law would be helpful to these
courts, but only for determining who is an agent, not for determining
when agents bind their principals. Perhaps because it seems to make all
employees agents,""' however, the courts in question almost totally ig-
nore the common law of agency. Freed of this limitation, they normally
restrict individual liability to employees with some degree of decision-
making power.16 2 The same is true in sexual harassment cases, in which
employees with sufficient supervisory power may be personally liable
under Title VII.L "'
F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding that because a superintendent is an agent of the employer and thus
fits within § 701(b)'s definition of employer, the employer is liable for his actions); see also
Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court, 825 F.2d 111, 116 (6th Cir. 1987) (reading § 701(b) as making an em-
ployer liable for acts of its agents).
160. See infra notes 162-63.
161. The Restatement, at least, takes this position. See supra note 79.
162. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Rogers, 791 F.2d 439, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding employees
liable as agents under § 701(b) if they participate in the decisionmaking process that forms the
basis of the discrimination); Williams v. City of Montgomery, 742 F.2d 586, 588-89 (11th Cir. 1984)
(classifying a personnel board as an agent of city and therefore itself liable under § 701(b)), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1053 (1985); Kolb v. Ohio, 721 F. Supp. 885, 891 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (holding em-
ployees responsible for making or contributing to employment decisions for their employer liable
as agents under § 701(b)); Perry v. Manocherian, 675 F. Supp. 1417, 1425 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding
partners of partnership and certain policymaking managers, but not a nonpolicymaking employee,
individually liable under § 701(b)); Duva v. Bridgeport Textron, 632 F. Supp. 880, 882 (E.D. Pa.
1985) (stating that supervisory employees are agents of employers and as such may be proper
defendants under Title VII); see generally 1 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 11, § 5.34; Anno-
tation, Meaning of Term "Employer" in § 701(b) of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
Amended, 69 A.L.R. FED. 191, § 6 (1984). Note that many of the cited cases were decided after
Meritor.
Coemployees, on the other hand, generally are not "agents" for Title VII purposes and thus
are not individually liable. See 1 A. LARsoN & L. LARSON, supra note 11, § 5.34, at 2-66 to -67.
163. See, e.g., Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227 (5th Cir. 1990) (imposing liability on a
defendant city employee in her official capacity because immediate supervisors are employers
under § 701(b) when their employer's traditional rights such as hiring and firing are delegated to
them); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989) (defining an individual as an
employer under Title VII if he serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant control
over the plaintiff's hiring, firing, or conditions of employment; but total control not needed and
defendant need not be plaintiff's actual supervisor), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds,
900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990); Howard v. Temple Urgent Care Center, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1416, 1416-17 (D. Conn. 1990) (holding that under § 701(b) supervisor is employer if he
participates in managerial decisions or significantly affects access to employment opportunities,
even if he lacks direct power to hire and fire); Burrell v. Truman Medical Center, Inc., 721 F.
Supp. 230, 232 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (holding that to be an agent and an employer under § 701(b), a
person must be supervisory or managerial employee of a Title VII employer, with responsibility for
some employment decisions); Hendrix v. Fleming Cos., 650 F. Supp. 301, 302 (W.D. Okla. 1986)
(holding that to be an employer under Title VII, one must be an officer, director, or supervisor of a
Title VII employer, or otherwise involved in managerial decisions); cf. Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842
F.2d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding foreman liable along with his employer because he knew of
sexual harassment and failed to take steps to correct it; no discussion of § 701(b)); Morris v. Amer-
ican Nat'l Can Corp., 730 F. Supp. 1489, 1496-97 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (holding a supervisor liable
because he failed to respond to plaintiff's complaints about harassment; no discussion of § 701(b)),
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Nothing in this well-settled interpretation of Section 701(b) sug-
gests that the Section makes covered employers vicariously liable for
their agents' actions. That an employee is an agent of a covered em-
ployer and therefore may be personally liable for his own discrimina-
tory acts implies nothing about his employer's liability for those acts. 64
Although Section 701(b) clearly makes agents of covered employers lia-
ble in their own right, it says nothing about those covered employers'
liability for discrimination by their agents.
2. Determining Vicarious Liability Under Title VII
On occasion, courts erroneously reading Section 701(b) as a vicari-
ous liability provision justify their position by asserting that employers
should not escape Title VII liability by delegating discriminatory ac-
tions to others." 5 This sound observation suggests a problem with the
argument just advanced: if Section 701(b) provides no basis for imput-
ing agents' discriminatory acts to their principals, just how is this nec-
essary imputation to be accomplished?
In his Meritor concurrence, Justice Marshall noted the general Ti-
tle VII rule that acts of supervisory employees or agents are automati-
cally imputed to their employers. 6 6 The cases so holding do not rely on
Section 701(b). Indeed, they do not provide any consistent rationale for
the imputation. Some of the decisions employ weak analogies to agency
law, 167 some combine these with appeals to Title VII's purposes, 68 and
afl'd, No. 90-1235, 90-2289, 1991 WL 153135 (8th Cir. Aug. 14, 1991).
As a general matter, courts applying these tests do not impose liability on nonsupervisory
coemployees. See, e.g., Smith v. Prudential Financial Servs., Inc., 739 F. Supp. 1042, 1043 (D.S.C.
1990) (holding an employee not liable because he worked in a nonmanagerial, nonsupervisory ca-
pacity and had no authority over the plaintiff); Bush v. Metro Transit Auth., 51 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1217, 1220 (D. Kan. 1989) (holding coworkers were not employers under § 701(b)
because they were not supervisors and did not participate in any employment decisions regarding
the plaintiff); Flowers v. Rego, 691 F. Supp. 177, 178-79 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (holding that nonsupervi-
sory employee is not employer under Title VII and is not personally liable); see also 1 A. LARSON &
L. LARSON, supra note 11, § 41.65(d), at 8-204.
164. Similarly, the fact that an agent generally is liable for her own torts, see generally W.
SEAVEY, supra note 89, § 129.33, by itself implies nothing about her principal's liability for those
torts.
165. E.g., Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court, 825 F.2d 111, 116 (6th Cir. 1987); Scott v. City of Topeka
Police & Fire Civil Serv. Comm'n, 739 F. Supp. 1434, 1438-39 (D. Kan. 1990).
166. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 75 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d
983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (generally charging employers with Title VII violations by supervisory
personnel); Bryan, supra note 16, at 45-46 (noting that in areas other than sexual harassment,
employers generally have declined to argue that they are not responsible for the acts of supervisory
employees, and courts have rejected such attempts when made).
167. E.g., Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding de-
fendant liable as principal for any violation of Title VII by foreman in his authorized capacity as
supervisor in case alleging racially discriminatory discharge); Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 n.7 (5th Cir. 1975) (forbidding defendant from disclaiming liability for
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some just flatly announce the rule.""' Significantly, though, nothing in
any of these cases compels recourse to the common law of agency.
If these cases do little to justify the imputation of Title VII liabil-
ity from employees to employers, perhaps the generally accepted tech-
niques of statutory interpretation might provide some help.170 As for
Title VII's plain meaning, this Article has argued at length that Section
701(b) simply is not a vicarious liability provision, and nothing else in
the statute appears to address this question.' 7' Moreover, as the D.C.
Circuit observed in Meritor, "[t]he legislative history of Title VII is vir-
tually barren of indications, one way or the other, of a vicarious respon-
sibility for employers.' 72
Turning from this narrowly focused concept of congressional intent
supervisor's apparently authorized actions in alleged constructive discharge based on religious
discrimination).
168. For example, in Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424, 436 (D. Utah 1971), in
which the plaintiff allegedly was fired for refusing to engage in racial discrimination against a job
applicant, the court held the defendant employer liable for the acts of a supervisor. It reasoned
that "[t]he modem corporate entity consists of the individuals who manage it, and little, if any,
progress in eradicating discrimination in employment will be made if the corporate employer is
able to hide behind the shield of individual employee action." Id. (citation omitted).
169. E.g., Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 369 F. Supp. 522, 537 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (deter-
mining in class action involving alleged sex discrimination that the defendant is not necessarily
responsible for acts of all its employees, but is responsible for acts of supervisory personnel), aff'd
in part & vacated in part, 541 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1976), and cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
170. Of course, a strict version of the general rule that authoritative prior interpretations of
statutes should be followed, see, e.g., E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 6-7, 54-57
(paperback ed. 1949), would make Meritor's command to consult agency principles absolutely
binding on subsequent courts and would preclude their consideration of alternatives. But the posi-
tion of this Article is that this holding should be changed by whatever institutional means are
appropriate.
171. Occasionally, however, it has been argued that because Title VII liability requires inten-
tional discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988), employers should be liable only when they
know or have reason to know of the harassment. See, e.g., Note, supra note 7, at 1165-68, 1176-77.
But this conclusion does not follow from its premise. Presumably, most sexual harassment involves
intentionally discriminatory behavior by the offending employee. This intent is potentially imputa-
ble to the employer. But the statutory requirement of intent does not imply any particular rule for
making the imputation from employee to employer. For example, the requirement is consistent
with a rule asserting that a harassing employee's intent to harass should always be imputed to his
employer. Such a rule would effectively make employers absolutely liable for all actionable harass-
ment by their employees.
The real aim of such a recommendation, however, apparently is to limit employer liability to
those situations in which it can plausibly be argued that the employer itself (i.e., its higher-level
managers) actually had the requisite intent. But the actual-or-constructive-knowledge test cannot
be justified in this way. It is possible to know of someone else's harassment, and even to acquiesce
in it, without intending that it be undertaken. More important, high-level management's construc-
tive knowledge of the harassment does not usually indicate an actual intent to harass. In other
words, limiting employer sexual harassment liability to situations in which high-level managers
had an actual intent to discriminate would mean very limited liability for employers-more limited
than the author of the suggestion or anyone else has recommended.
172. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Meritor Say. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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to Congress's broader purposes17 3 in enacting Title VII's ban on sex dis-
crimination, courts often assert that Congress intended "to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women" in employ-
ment.17 4 Because in the corporate setting such disparate treatment is
accomplished by the artificial corporate person's employees or other
agents, some rule of vicarious liability is necessary to achieve Congress's
purpose. But it is doubtful that the congressional purpose dictates any
particular rule. Furthermore, because it is unlikely that striking at the
entire spectrum of gender-based disparate treatment is Title VII's only
purpose, courts might have to balance that purpose against the statute's
other aims in particular cases. 17 5 Moreover, judges sometimes interpret
statutes in the light of general public purposes extraneous to those stat-
utes. 7 6 Thus, in the employer liability context, Title VII apparently
leaves courts to their own devices and the statute's interpretation evi-
dently differs little from outright policymaking.
C. Toward Better Liability Standards
Because Title VII seems not to address the employer liability issue,
general policy must determine which standards are most desirable. This
determination is difficult to make because it depends on ethical issues
that are controversial and on empirical questions that have not been
resolved. Thus, while this Article makes some recommendations on the
subject, they are only tentative. All this uncertainty, moreover, could
give Meritor's defenders a last-ditch argument for allowing agency law
some role in determining the best employer liability rules. Although Ti-
tle VII does not command the use of agency law, they might argue,
agency principles could still fill the void created by Congress's failure to
address the vicarious liability issue. Despite being almost useless as a
legal guide, these principles might still embody a set of policies that
courts can utilize when grappling with employer liability questions.
As it turns out, however, agency law speaks with more than one
voice at the ethical level as well as the legal level. Ultimately, then, it is
useless even as a policy guide for fashioning employer liability rules.
173. "Purpose" means the overall end, aim, or object of the legislation rather than some
congressional conclusion about the meaning of particular words. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200-08 (1979) (upholding a voluntary minority preference as consistent with
Title Vii's purpose of minority assimilation although the literal language of Title VII and Con-
gress's likely conclusions about that language's meaning would forbid the preference).
174. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (citation omitted).
175. For an attempt to do something like this in the sexual harassment context, see Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 998-1001 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
176. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596-99 (1983) (using the gen-
eral public policy against racial discrimination in education as one justification for denying tax-
exempt status to a private university that discriminated on the basis of race).
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Thus, although this section fails to resolve the employer liability ques-
tion conclusively, it at least reaches one firm conclusion: Courts should
avoid the common law of agency when determining an employer's Title
VII liability for sexual harassment.
1. Two Objections to Strict Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment
In his dissent from the D.C. Circuit's refusal to grant an en banc
hearing in Meritor, Judge Robert Bork remarked that "[i]n this case,
the employer could not have done more to avoid liability without actu-
ally monitoring or policing his employees' voluntary sexual relation-
ships.' 11 7 Judge Bork's statement might mean that it is inherently
wrong to penalize employers for employee sexual harassment when the
employer did not intend for harassment to occur and was neither negli-
gent nor reckless in allowing it.17 8 Implicit in this reading is the familiar
view that liability should be imposed only on actors who are morally at
fault. In the sexual harassment context, of course, most of the relevant
actors are corporations. This raises a problem that has been widely dis-
cussed in the business ethics literature: Is the artificial corporate person
also a "moral person" to whom notions like blame, duty, conscience,
dignity, and rights can attach? 79 If not, basing corporate employers'
liability on moral fault might mean that they would never be liable sim-
ply because corporations are not the sorts of entities to which moral
fault can attach.180 Then again, if corporations are not moral persons,
perhaps the law can treat them however it likes because they lack the
rights natural persons possess."" The most important objection to a
177. Vinson, 760 F.2d at 1331 n.3 (Bork, J., dissenting). Echoing Judge Bork on the em-
ployee privacy point are, for example, Note, supra note 7, at 1177-78, and Note, Employer Liabil-
ity, supra note 9, at 1278. But see infra note 188 and accompanying text (noting how infrequently
restrictions on employee privacy are advocated in the business literature on preventing sexual
harassment).
178. Cf. Conte & Gregory, supra note 129, at 412 n.18 (arguing that application of strict
liability for acts of supervisors may be "manifestly unfair" to the employer when a supervisor
acted outside authority and without the employer's knowledge).
179. See generally the essays in SHAMS, REsPoNsmmrry AND THE CORPORATION (H. Curtler
ed., 1986). Perhaps the most widely cited article on this subject, John Ladd's Morality and the
Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations, 54 MoNIST 488 (1970), emphatically takes the view
that corporations are not moral persons.
180. Because the question is whether it is right to punish corporations, I doubt that imputing
managers' fault to the firm would avoid this conclusion. If one assumes that entities only should be
penalized if they individually are at fault, and if A is not the sort of entity to which terms like
fault apply, how is it just to penalize A by imputing B's fault to it?
181. One might argue that it is wrong to impose strict liability on corporations because the
resulting costs may be passed on to such presumably innocent parties as shareholders, employees,
consumers, local communities, and so forth. Cf. Metzger & Schwenk, Decision Making Models,
Devil's Advocacy, and the Control of Corporate Crime, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 323, 327-32 (1990). This
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completely fault-based theory of sexual harassment liability, however, is
that it absolutizes the moral intuition that penalties should be imposed
only on the blameworthy and ignores the attendant consequences. 182
For example, such a theory makes it impossible even to consider
whether strict employer liability might reduce the incidence of sexual
harassment.
But Judge Bork probably did not argue that it is intrinsically bad
to impose liability without fault; rather, he most likely suggested merely
that doing so has unfortunate consequences in the sexual harassment
context. 83 After asserting that the bank could not have done more to
prevent harassment without invading employee privacy, he added:
"Aside from the very outrageousness of such policing, it would be a very
high cost way, undoubtedly the highest cost way, of solving the prob-
lem.' 1 8 4 Judge Richard Posner shares Judge Bork's view that a strict
liability standard is unworkable in the sexual harassment context.
Judge Posner remarked in one case that:
The rule that falls out of Meritor and the cases following it is less a derivation
from the statutory language than a recognition of the unrealism of expecting an
employer to be able to purge every trace of sexual harassment from the workplace;
so strict liability would add nothing to liability based on fault.285
Presumably, strict liability would "add nothing" because imposing it
would not purchase a significant reduction in the incidence of sexual
harassment.
argument, however, would defeat much or most corporate civil liability if it were taken seriously.
182. In the terminology sometimes used by ethicists, this view basically is a deontological
moral theory. Such theories generally assert that the morality of certain acts depends at least in
part on factors other than their consequences. See, e.g., W. FRANKENA, ETcs 14 (1963). Indeed,
the straw man this Article sets up carries this approach to an extreme by asserting that moral fault
is the only factor to be considered in imposing legal liability.
Due to their anticonsequentialism, extreme deontological theories naturally have come under
criticism. For example, John Rawls, himself widely regarded as a deontologist, once observed: "All
ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One
which did not would be simply irrational, crazy." J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 30 (1971). In-
deed, Immanuel Kant may be the only completely uncompromising deontologist. See, e.g., J.
RACHEis, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 104 (1986).
183. On this reading, the statement would be expressing a teleological or consequentialist
moral orientation. See, e.g., W. FRANKENA, supra note 182, at 13 (arguing that in a teleological
theory, the ultimate standard or criterion of an action's rightness or wrongness is the amount of
net value of goodness that it brings into being). The most important contemporary teleological or
consequentialist ethical theory is utilitarianism. E.g., id. at 29. And under utilitarian criteria, soci-
ety may impose punishment when doing so would maximize net aggregate satisfaction. For this
reason, punishment may be imposed irrespective of fault. E.g., J. RACHELS, supra note 182, at 121
(asserting that nothing in the idea of utilitarianism limits punishment to the guilty or its amount
to the amount "deserved").
184. Vinson, 760 F.2d at 1331 n.3.
185. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1990).
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2. Programs for Reducing Sexual Harassment
The basic thrust of Judge Bork's and Judge Posner's statements is
that while strict liability for employee sexual harassment might stimu-
late employers to eliminate it from the workplace, this result either can-
not be achieved or can be accomplished only at excessive human and
financial costs. The facts of Meritor highlight the fallacy of this posi-
tion. Although the bank in that case had a policy against discrimina-
tion, the policy did not specifically address sexual harassment.8 6 The
distinction is important because the business literature consistently em-
phasizes the need for employers to adopt comprehensive programs
aimed specifically at workplace sexual harassment. 187
Policing employees' voluntary sexual relationships does not figure
prominently within these recommended programs. 88 Instead, the litera-
ture consistently entreats employers to: (1) adopt a written, communi-
cated policy defining and forbidding sexual harassment; and (2)
establish a grievance procedure through which the policy can be en-
forced. 8 ' Although the point is not emphasized as often and as emphat-
ically as it should be, 90 presumably these policies and procedures
would involve sanctions against demonstrated harassers. 19' Employers
186. Mertor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72-73 (1986).
187. See, e.g., Bahls, Stopping Sexual Harassment, Bus. CREDrr, July-Aug. 1988, at 53, 54-
55; Bradshaw, Sexual Harassment: Confronting the Troublesome Issues, PERSONNEL ADMIN., Jan.
1987, at 51, 52-53; Deane, Sexual Harassment-Is Your Company Protected?, Bus., Apr.-June
1986, at 42, 43-44; Frierson, Reduce the Costs of Sexual Harassment, PERSONNEL J., Nov. 1989, at
79, 79-83 (proposing more or less comprehensive antiharassment programs).
188. Indeed, the suggestion appears infrequently in the literature, and normally is made with
trepidation. See, e.g., Bahls, supra note 187, at 55 (suggesting that employers consider a policy
against employee dating); Deane, supra note 187, at 44 (noting that sexual harassment claims by
third parties due to affairs between supervisors and coemployees may make it advisable for em-
ployers to monitor the work environment to detect consensual sexual relations, but terming the
problem "delicate" and stating no guidelines for resolving it); cf. Ending Sexual Harassment: Bus-
iness is Getting the Message, Bus. WK., Mar. 18, 1991, at 98, 99 [hereinafter Getting the Message]
(reporting that some firms are auditing work areas for nude pinups).
189. See, e.g., Bahls, supra note 187, at 55; Bradshaw, supra note 187, at 52; Deane, supra
note 187, at 43-44; Frierson, supra note 187, at 79-80; Kandel, Sexual Harassment: Persistent,
Prevalent, but Preventable, 14 EMPLOYm REL. L.J. 439, 441-46 (1988); Terpstra, Who Gets Sexu-
ally Harassed?, PERSONNEL ADMN., Mar. 1989, at 88, 111; Thornton, Sexual Harassment, 1: Dis-
couraging It in the Work Place, PERSONNEL, Apr. 1986, at 22, 24-25; Woods & Flynn, Heading Off
Sexual Harassment, PERSONNEL, Nov. 1989, at 48-49. On the handling of sexual harassment com-
plaints by personnel managers, see, e.g., Bradshaw, supra note 187, at 52-53; Connell, Investigat-
ing the Sexual Harassment Complaint, 77 MGmT. RE V., Apr. 1988, 45, 46-48; Frierson, supra note
187, at 80-82; Kandel, supra, at 444-46.
190. An exception is Thomann & Strickland, Line Managers and the Daily Round of Work:
The Front-Line Defense Against Sexual Harassment, INDUS. MGMT., May-June 1990, at 14, 15
(arguing that "line managers must be willing to withhold pay raises, promotions, and other valued
rewards when subordinates fail to conform to acceptable standards... of social-sexual conduct").
191. It appears that many existing antiharassment programs impose such sanctions, at least
on occasion. See infra note 194.
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may also screen for potential harassers during job interviews, emphasize
the firm's antiharassment policies during orientation, implement em-
ployee education in its various forms, involve line managers in the ef-
fort to stem harassment, and inquire in exit interviews whether
departing employees left because they were harassed.'92
If widely adopted, antiharassment programs of this sort could have
several beneficial effects. They could drastically reduce employees' pro-
pensity to harass by sensitizing them to the offensiveness of behavior
they once regarded as innocent fun, and by creating a corporate culture
in which harassment is taboo. If employees actually have the option to
use viable grievance procedures and employers actually enforce an-
tiharassment policies, the firm itself might eliminate much unwelcome
sex-related behavior, sparing all concerned the costs and frustrations of
litigation. Firms might also reduce the costs resulting from lower job
performance, absenteeism, and turnover-all problems that often flow
from sexual harassment in the workplace. 193 These benefits are particu-
larly likely if firms impose strict sanctions on the most consistent and
egregious offenders. 94 Moreover, if those firms' enforcement procedures
maintain confidentiality and make accurate determinations of guilt,
such offenders are unlikely to succeed in defamation or wrongful dis-
charge suits."9 '
192. See, e.g., Bahls, supra note 187, at 55 (discussing exit interviews); Bradshaw, supra note
187, at 52 (advocating educating employees about both harassment and firm's policies and proce-
dures); Frierson, supra note 187, at 80 (same); Getting the Message, supra note 188, at 99 (advo-
cating holding role-playing sessions and distributing booklets spelling out inappropriate conduct);
Thomann & Strickland, supra note 190, at 14-15 (discussing screening during job interviews, edu-
cating during orientation, and involving line managers); Woods & Flynn, supra note 189, at 48-49
(suggesting comprehensive employee education about nature of sexual harassment and its legal
implications, as well as company policies on subject).
193. See, e.g., Thomann & Strickland, supra note 190, at 14; Thornton, supra note 189, at
22; see also Licata & Popovich, Preventing Sexual Harassment: A Proactive Approach, TRAINING
& DEV. J., May 1987, at 34 (discussing Office of Management and Budget estimates that sexual
harassment cost the federal government $189 million due to turnover during 1978-1980 period);
Sandroff, Sexual Harassment in the Fortune 500, WORIG WoMAN, Dec. 1988, at 69, 71 (assert-
ing, without any stated basis, that "[s]exual harassment costs a typical Fortune 500 company with
23,750 employees $6.7 million per year in absenteeism, low productivity and employee turnover").
194. This appears to be happening to some degree. For example, an article reporting on a
survey of 160 Fortune 500 firms claims that more than half include a description of investigation
procedures and possible disciplinary actions in their written antiharassment policies. It asserts that
eight out of ten offenders are given a verbal or written warning; that two in ten are eventually
discharged; and that transfer, suspension, probation, and demotion are used in less than six per-
cent of cases. Sandroff, supra note 193, at 72.
195. Such suits apparently are becoming increasingly common. See, e.g., I A. LARSON & L.
LARSON, supra note 11, § 41.65(c), at 8-201 (noting the occurrence of defamation suits by men who
were fired or transferred after being accused of sexual harassment); Bradshaw, supra note 187, at
52 (arguing that employers should ensure that they are not trading a sexual harassment suit for a
wrongful termination suit by insisting on strong evidence that alleged offender actually engaged in
harassment).
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Given all of this, it might appear that the law should encourage
firms to adopt antiharassment policies by imposing across-the-board
strict liability.196 But this approach is unlikely to appeal to those who
feel strongly that liability should be based on fault.197 The issues under-
lying the disagreement between such people and those who approach
liability consequentially are difficult and cannot be resolved here.198
What is certain, however, is that agency principles contribute nothing
to the resolution of these questions. It is true that certain rules of
agency law embody each of the two views sketched earlier. For example,
direct liability and the employer's traditional nondelegable duties are
clearly fault-based.'99 Respondeat superior, on the other hand, creates a
species of strict liability which is based on a risk-spreading rationale
that emphasizes the consequences of liability. 200 But as these examples
illustrate, agency law does not speak with one voice on the question of
whether the law should adopt fault-based liability standards or conse-
quentialist standards. More important, it does not tell us how to resolve
the ethical issues that underlie this choice.
Agency law also is useless in resolving various empirical issues that
bear on the desirability of using strict liability to reduce harassment by
stimulating employers to adopt the recommended programs. An article
in a major management journal recently observed that sexual harass-
ment has received little empirical research attention; most studies on
the subject are surveys attempting to assess harassment's frequency. 20'
Thus, little evidence exists about the overall effectiveness of sexual har-
assment programs.2 0 2 Currently, however, some three-quarters of the
196. Although not necessarily endorsing across-the-board strict liability, observers often note
that imposing it will have a useful stimulative effect on employers. See, e.g., Sykes, The Bounda-
ries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related
Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 563, 607 (1988); Note, Between the Boss and a Hard Place,
supra note 9, at 457-58; Note, supra note 14, at 1462.
197. One way to counter this objection is to argue that employers who fail to adopt appropri-
ate antiharassment policies are morally at fault. But this argument depends on the effectiveness of
such policies, and their effectiveness is uncertain. See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 182-83, which hopefully suggest as much.
199. See supra notes 120-22, 138-39 and accompanying text.
200. As one treatise explains:
The rule tends to foster safety measures. The master is likely to be more careful in the selec-
tion and supervision of servants if responsible for their conduct.. . [H]e can readily procure
liability insurance which removes any substantial risk of personal disaster and, in business
ventures, the premiums are, in the end, borne by those whom the business serves.
W. SEAVEY, supra note 89, § 83A, at 141.
201. York, Defining Sexual Harassment in Workplaces: A Policy-Capturing Approach, 32
ACAD. MGMT. J. 830 (1989).
202. See, e.g., Champagne & McAfee, Auditing Sexual Harassment, PERSONNEL J., June
1989, at 124, 132 (noting that few organizations appear to have systematically evaluated the effec-
tiveness of their programs, and the next step is for them to begin audits of their antiharassment
policies). But see Frierson, supra note 187, at 80 (finding that many companies find a long-run
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country's larger firms have adopted antiharassment policies, and they
have done so mainly because they fear legal liability.20 3 Nonetheless,
several commentators have suggested that some of the programs al-
ready adopted lack features essential to their optimum functioning or
are not properly implemented." 4 This observation could suggest the fu-
tility of using the law to reduce the incidence of sexual harassment by
stimulating employers to adopt programs for curtailing it. Then again,
it could argue for redoubled efforts-including strict liability-for club-
bing employers into line.
3. Some Conjectures About Preferable Employer Liability Standards
The main contention of this Article is that agency law should play
little or no role in determining an employer's Title VII liability for em-
ployees' sexual harassment. Among the many reasons for rejecting
agency principles are the incoherent legal guidance they provide and
their utter failure to address the policy issues the employer liability
question presents. Lest this analysis be accused of the same failings,
some conclusions about desirable employer liability standards are in or-
der. For all the reasons stated earlier, however, those conclusions are
tentative. With that qualification in mind, the preferred approach is for
courts to apply strict liability for all forms of supervisory harassment
while continuing to use the actual-or-constructive-knowledge test for
work environment harassment by coemployees.
As suggested earlier, the courts' differing treatment of supervisory
quid pro quo harassment and supervisory work environment harass-
decrease in sexual harassment complaints after adopting their policies). Neither of these sources
cited any data to support their conclusory statements. A very recent article in Business Week
noted the antiharassment efforts made by many firms, but did not discuss their effectiveness. See
Getting the Message, supra note 188.
203. See, e.g., Champagne & McAfee, supra note 202, at 132 (stating that most medium- and
large-sized firms have taken the EEOC's sexual harassment guidelines seriously by developing poli-
cies and programs dealing specifically with sexual harassment); Sandroff, supra note 193, at 70
(reporting that 76% of 160 Fortune 500 firms surveyed have written policies banning sexual har-
assment as of 1988, and another 16% ban harassment through their antidiscrimination policies;
66% of those surveyed said EEOC Guidelines prompted their policies and 54% said general fear of
legal exposure also contributed to this decision); see also Frierson, supra note 187, at 79 (describ-
ing a 1987 Bureau of National Affairs survey showing that about three-fourths of the relevant
firms had adopted their antiharassment policies for legal reasons).
204. See, e.g., Champagne & McAfee, supra note 202, at 132 (reporting that some firms have
only given lip service to the EEOC Guidelines); Frierson, supra note 187, at 79 (arguing that many
companies have ineffective policies that fail to provide fair and prompt investigations, protect
against false accusations, effectively discipline harassers, and educate employees); Getting the
Message, supra note 188, at 99 (finding that some companies adopted "one-shot" approach by
merely putting appropriate boilerplate in employee handbooks, but failing to publicize those poli-
cies or circumventing them); see also supra note 195 (suggesting some problems in disciplining
harassers).
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ment lacks justification.205 The question becomes, then, which stan-
dard-strict liability or the actual-or-constructive-knowledge
test-should apply in these two cases? For several reasons, strict liabil-
ity seems preferable. First, Title VII generally imposes strict employer
liability for the actions of supervisors;206 interpreting a statute consist-
ently throughout all its applications is certainly a desirable legal goal.
Second, strict liability for supervisory harassment may be economically
more efficient than the alternatives.20 7 The most important reason for
applying strict liability, however, is its tendency to make employer an-
tiharassment programs more effective. For such programs to be effec-
tive, employers probably need all the stimulus the law can provide.208
In the case of work environment harassment by coworkers, how-
ever, this stimulus may prove ineffective. In many instances of supervi-
sory harassment, it is possible to penalize the perpetrator without
unduly disrupting the organization's functioning.20 9 Because sexual har-
assment charges can damage careers210 and because supervisors presum-
ably comprise a relatively ambitious and rational group, supervisory
harassment might be more or less deterrable. Work environment har-
assment by coemployees, however, may sometimes be another story.211
205. The main legal prop for this distinction has been Henson's "authority" rationale. On
that rationale and the problems it presents, see supra subpart I1(A).
206. See supra notes 30, 49 and accompanying text.
207. See Sykes, supra note 196, at 606-08.
208. This stimulus might increase if strict liability were supplemented by a rule under which
employers that adopt and enforce suitable antiharassment programs would have their liability de-
termined under the actual-or-constructive-knowledge test instead. Cf. id. at 608 (advocating a sim-
ilar rule for work environment harassment by coemployees). By giving complying employers a
"plum" for their labors, this rule could further stimulate the development of suitable programs. It
also could augment the effectiveness of such programs by giving victims an incentive to report
harassment, thus maximizing employers' opportunities to correct it. The incentive would exist be-
cause unless middle- or high-level managers independently acquire actual or constructive knowl-
edge of harassment, victims who fail to report it will be unable to hold their employers liable under
Title VII if those employers have adopted a suitable policy. This suggested rule has an additional
bonus: because it rewards especially virtuous employers, it might appeal to those for whom fault is
the decisive consideration in fashioning vicarious liability rules.
The benefits just enumerated, however, must be balanced against the possibility that some
victims may fail to recover either because they fear retaliation if they invoke their employer's
procedure or because they simply are ignorant of the rule. Finally, because the rule only relieves
firms that adopt and enforce suitable policies, courts would have to evaluate the appropriateness of
both a firm's program and its enforcement. For these reasons, the rule could be difficult to
administer.
209. Cf. Sandroff, supra note 193, at 72 (discussing sanctions imposed within some Fortune
500 firms). As this discussion suggests, however, this may not be true when the harasser is a "star."
210. Id. (asserting that "today a charge of harassment can damage a promising career").
211. Cf. Ford & McLaughlin, Sexual Harassment at Work, Bus. HORIZONS, Nov.-Dec. 1988,
at 19 (suggesting that sexual harassment policies have not been particularly effective in dealing
with hostile environment harassment, but not distinguishing between supervisors and coworkers in
this connection); Getting the Message, supra note 188, at 99 (noting that while quid pro quo suits
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Not infrequently such harassment results from the injection of women
into "extraordinarily complex male dominated subcultures where loy-
alty to the crew often takes precedence over all else and is seen as a
prerequisite for survival on the job. 2 12 The attitudes characterizing
such subcultures may be relatively impervious to change from outside.
Although individually the harassing coworkers probably are unimpor-
tant to their employers, collectively they may sometimes be indispensa-
ble and not easily replaced.213  Thus, it is possible that making
employers strictly liable for work environment harassment by cowork-
ers would purchase relatively little reduction in this form of harass-
ment. Under these circumstances, the conceded undesirability of
imposing liability without fault becomes the decisive factor in the moral
equation and tips the balance toward an actual-or-constructive-knowl-
edge standard rather than a strict liability standard. 214 But this conclu-
sion depends on an empirical assumption-the difficulty of eliminating
coworkers' environmental harassment-that is anything but certain.
Nonetheless, what is certain is that agency principles contribute noth-
ing to resolution of the question.
V. CONCLUSION
Writing in 1964 Warren Seavey led off the preface to his agency
treatise by observing that:
Agency has attracted very few writers. There are few law review articles and,
aside from the Restatement, no very recent texts. Perhaps for this reason, it has
been given diminishing attention in law schools; the time given to it now is far less
than its intrinsic importance warrants, since practically all of the world's business
have leveled off, work environment suits have increased).
212. Spann, Dealing Effectively with Sexual Harassment: Some Practical Lessons from One
City's Experience, 19 PUB. PsSONNEL MGMT., Spring 1990, at 53, 64 (mentioning firefighters, po-
lice officers, bus drivers, and maintenance workers as examples).
213. This problem could arise, for example, when city governments confront work environ-
ment harassment among their firefighters or police forces. See supra note 212 and accompanying
text. See also Spann, supra note 212, at 64-68 (raising this problem but not satisfactorily resolving
it). Another example is presented by Hall v. Gus Construction Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988),
in which the defendant's road construction crew subjected three female "flag persons" to a pattern
of egregious work environment harassment. In each case, is firing all or some of the offenders a
genuine option for their employers? When it is not a real option, how likely are the employers to
use other sanctions and how often will such sanctions be effective?
214. Assuming they are accurate, however, the arguments in this paragraph suggest a prob-
lem with even this standard: if employers are unlikely to eliminate coworkers' work environment
harassment because the task is so daunting and the costs so great, why impose liability on them at
all? One reason is simply to provide harassment victims with another avenue of relief. Also, in at
least some cases firms that fail to correct work environment harassment probably can be regarded
as morally at fault, and thus deserving of the punishment Title VII liability imposes. For example,
firms may negligently fail to discover correctable harassment, may knowingly fail to correct such
harassment, or may fail to do all that they reasonably might when it is uncertain whether correc-
tive actions would work.
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involves agents and in most important transactions, an agent on each side. This in
turn results in a poor understanding of its characteristic features. 215
Perhaps this poor understanding helps explain the actions of the EEOC
and the Supreme Court in Meritor, as well as the post-Meritor courts'
uneven performance.216 Of particular importance here is the ubiquitous
but rarely articulated myth that agency law comprises a simple set of
basic principles that find easy application in many contexts. Of course,
the EEOC's and the Court's resort to agency law might be explained in
other ways as well. Such explanations usually presume that agency
principles are less tough on employers than the liability standards that
would be imposed in their absence. This desire to limit employer liabil-
ity may reflect the ambivalence some courts feel about the sexual har-
assment cause of action,217 which Congress surely did not contemplate
when it banned sex discrimination in Title VII. It also may reflect a
general animus toward government regulation and a related desire to
allow employers to reassert certain traditional prerogatives. Viewed in
this way, Meritor can be regarded as a harbinger of the Court's contro-
versial 1988-1989 employment discrimination decisions. 2 i8
Whatever its motivation, Meritor's command that courts consult
agency principles to determine employer sexual harassment liability
was most unfortunate. The main reason is agency law's inapplicability
both to sexual harassment cases and to the policy issues sexual harass-
ment presents. Although it may have erred when it called respondeat
superior a tort rule, the D.C. Circuit's Meritor opinion basically got
things right when it said:
Title VII is a mandate from Congress to cure a perceived evil-certain types of
215. W. SEAVEY, supra note 89, at ix (footnote omitted). It seems safe to say that little has
changed since Seavey wrote these words. E.g., Farber & Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel:
Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 903, 917 (1985) (stating that
"[b]ecause agency law has all but disappeared as a separate legal discipline, attorneys, judges, and
law clerks are ill-equipped to perceive agency issues").
216. For an argument that the EEOC should bear most of the blame, see Levy, supra note 7,
at 816 (asserting that due to the EEOC's confusion on agency law, it is little wonder that the
Meritor majority was determined to say as little as possible on the employer liability question).
Although Professor Levy probably is too easy on the Court, the EEOC's Meritor brief is a font of
misinformation on agency law. See, e.g., supra note 93.
217. "Believing that the [sexual harassment] cause of action should be limited, many courts
have fettered it with requirements that have no basis in the language of Title VII, its legislative
history or its judicial interpretations." Attanasio, supra note 12, at 5.
218. See, e.g., Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2373-75 (1989) (interpret-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) as applying only to discrimination in the making and enforcement of
private contracts, including employment contracts); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2184-88
(1989) (holding that parties who are affected by a consent decree following Title VII litigation can
later challenge the decree, even though they were not parties to the litigation out of which it
arose); Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2121-27 (1989) (toughening the re-
quirements for recovery in Title VII disparate impact cases).
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discrimination in employment-in a prescribed fashion. Rules of tort law, on the
other hand, have evolved over centuries to meet diverse societal demands by allo-
cating risks of harm and duties of care. Without clear congressional instruction, we
think it unsafe in developing Title VH jurisprudence to rely uncritically on dogma
thus begotten.2 1
The Supreme Court believed that Title VII's Section 701(b) is a "clear
congressional instruction" to use agency law for determining employer
liability, but the Court almost certainly was wrong. For this reason, and
all the others this Article presents, agency law is irrelevant to employer
liability for sexual harassment. Courts should abandon its use
forthwith.
219. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (footnote omitted), aff'd sub
nom. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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